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ABSTRACT
BANK LENDING AND RELATIONSHIP CAPITAL
Mohammed Yasser Boualam
Itay Goldstein
I develop an equilibrium theory of bank lending relationships in an economy subject to
search frictions and limited enforceability. The model features a dynamic contracting prob-
lem embedded within a directed search equilibrium with aggregate and bank-specific uncer-
tainty. The interaction between search and agency frictions generates a slow accumulation
of lending relationship capital and distorts the optimal allocation of credit along both in-
tensive and extensive margins. A crisis characterized by a sizable destruction of lending
relationships therefore leads to a significant contraction in credit and a slow recovery, consis-
tent with the Great Recession. I calibrate the model to study aggregate and cross-sectional
implications and analyze policies aimed at reviving bank lending.
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CHAPTER 1 : BANK LENDING AND RELATIONSHIP CAPITAL
1.1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis caused a severe disruption in bank credit markets. Limited access
to bank financing impacted households and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
with sharp economic consequences.1 Banks’ persistent reluctance to lend has been at the
heart of policy debate and academic research, with recent macro-finance literature high-
lighting the critical role of deteriorated bank balance sheets and the scarcity of financial
intermediary capital in amplifying the crisis and restricting bank lending.2 Yet, despite
the stabilization of the banking system, an improving economic outlook, and many policy
interventions, the flow of business lending has remained markedly low.
This paper argues that two key factors contribute to the sluggish credit recovery: the
severance of bank lending relationships during the crisis and the consequent process of credit
reallocation. In particular, I show how an environment characterized by search frictions and
long-term financing contracts subject to limited enforcement can generate slow recoveries,
consistent with the Great Recession.
My analysis is based on two premises inherent to bank lending markets for SMEs. First,
relationship lending matters because banks are a critical source of external finance and
the repeated interaction between borrowers and lenders relaxes contracting distortions and
gradually enhances credit flow.3 In this paper, these long-term financing contracts are
subject to limited enforceability, which reflects the borrower’s inability to commit to a given
arrangement. This is notably relevant for small and private firms with limited or opaque
collateral. Second, the process of credit reallocation is important because establishing these
lending relationships can be costly and time-consuming in decentralized and imperfectly
competitive environments. This is the case for credit markets in which both borrowers and
1Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Chodorow-Reich (2014), Greenstone et al. (2014).
2Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2012), Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2014), Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012), Bigio (2014), Rampini and Viswanathan (2015).
3Petersen and Rajan (1995), Boot and Thakor (2000).
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lenders often devote significant time and resources to locate the right matches.
A salient feature of my approach to bank lending is that it highlights the importance of the
market structure and the contracting environment, and does not rely on fluctuating bank
balance sheets or firm collateral values. I use the term “relationship capital” to describe a
slow-moving form of intangible capital reflecting the banking sector’s aggregate capacity to
funnel credit into existing lending relationships. Accumulating relationship capital is influ-
enced by the joint effects of frictions hampering both the formation (extensive margin) and
build-up (intensive margin) of bank-firm pairs. As a consequence, the reallocation of credit
in the aftermath of a crisis can be very slow. The model uncovers a propagation mechanism
relying on two distinct channels. The first channel (“credit relationship channel”) affects
the dynamics of credit availability and pricing of existing lending relationships. The second
channel (“credit origination channel”) operates through search and matching and impacts
the bank’s decision to offer new credit opportunities as well as the contractual terms at
origination.
In the first part of this paper, I develop and fully characterize a dynamic contracting
problem embedded within a directed search equilibrium with aggregate and bank-specific
uncertainty. The model has two interconnected building blocks. The first relates to the
dynamic contracting problem with limited enforceability, as in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004). The borrowing capacity of the firm endogenously emerges as part of the optimal
contract solution. When firm value is initially low, the agency problem impedes the amount
of credit available because the entrepreneur has the option of not repaying the debt and
searching for a new financier after a temporary exclusion from credit markets. The optimal
contract specifies credit terms that gradually improve over time. Intuitively, by backloading
firm claims to future cash flows, the bank can minimize the contract distortions due to the
participation constraint of the entrepreneur and therefore extend more credit throughout
the lending relationship.
The second building block of the model describes the problem of credit origination preced-
2
ing the contracting stage. I consider a frictional meeting process modeled through directed
search, as in Moen (1997), where heterogeneous banks compete for borrowers by posting
long-term credit offers. Banks differ with respect to their funding costs and optimize over
the offered contractual terms by taking into account the trade-off between loan profitability
and the probability of attracting unfunded borrowers. The nature of this trade-off is endoge-
nously determined through bank entry and the ratio of the number of credit opportunities
to the number of applications. The introduction of search frictions delays the formation of
lending relationships. More important, it endogenizes contractual terms at origination and
firm outside option and characterizes the degree of competition in credit markets.
It is particularly interesting to analyze a dynamic framework in which both intensive and
extensive margins are at work. The interaction between agency and search frictions induces
credit market conditions to affect firm default incentives directly. It therefore shapes the
dynamics of optimal contracts and the transmission of shocks across borrowers and lenders.
The analysis exhibits differences between effects at both micro and macro levels. At the
bank level, search frictions limit the access to credit for defaulting firms, ease the agency
problem, and hence allow for larger credit availability. At the aggregate level, however, this
slows down the creation of new lending relationships and can consequently lead to lower
credit supply overall.
In the second part of the paper, I evaluate whether this mechanism is a meaningful source
of persistence in credit markets. I consider two types of aggregate shocks: a productivity
shock and a bank funding cost shock. I show that negative shocks to firm productivity and
positive shocks to bank funding costs can cause a significant decline in credit supply along
both intensive and extensive margins. The effect on the intensive margin is short-lived
and is driven directly by the diminishing returns to production. Conversely, shocks are
propagated along the extensive margin of credit through their negative impact on the stock
of lending relationships and hence the number of producing firms in the economy.
In the cross-section, the model allows us to study how aggregate shocks impact the real
3
sector. In particular, the analysis reveals an asymmetric treatment between funded and
unfunded firms. The banking sector provides insurance against aggregate shocks in the
economy and helps smooth out the cash flow profiles of incumbent borrowers. The extent of
the pass-through depends on the bank’s funding cost level and the duration of the lending
relationship. However, unfunded firms are not shielded from shocks. As credit market
tightness and bank competition decrease, they not only face a more limited access to lenders,
but they also experience a sharp decline in credit availability and high interest rates once
matched.
Finally, this paper has important policy implications. The model provides a better un-
derstanding of the credit reallocation process and is therefore particularly relevant when
analyzing the effects of policies targeted toward business lending and banking regulations.
Significantly, I show that a policy subsidizing the cost of credit origination can have redis-
tributional consequences and, while being effective at incentivizing banks to expand their
lending supply in the long-run, can in fact be counterproductive in the short-run.
The model integrates relationship banking into the macro-finance literature. To my knowl-
edge, this paper is the first joint study of the macroeconomic implications of search frictions
and long-term financing contracts. The standard paradigm in the literature studying ag-
gregate implications of financial frictions — starting with Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) — relies on simple one-period interactions between anonymous
borrowers and lenders.4 My paper departs from this line of research along two key dimen-
sions by constructing a dynamic equilibrium model that takes into account both the process
of formation of bank-firm pairs and the long-term nature of financing contracts. Moreover,
by considering repeated interactions between borrowers and lenders, the model allows for
endogenous borrowing limits that depend on the history of the lending relationship and
credit market conditions.
This novel approach to credit markets emphasizes the importance of relationship banking
4Brunnermeier et al. (2012) provide an excellent survey of this literature.
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at the aggregate level.5 In particular, it is related to Allen and Gale (1997) and Berlin
and Mester (1999), who highlight the role of banks as providers of intertemporal insurance
for long-term borrowers. The paper is also connected to Bolton et al. (2016), who analyze
the difference between relationship and transaction lending during normal and crisis times
within a three-period setting.
From a modeling perspective, my paper builds on the literature of long-term financing con-
tracts in which credit constraints emerge endogenously as a feature of the optimal contract
design.6 Specifically, it draws on insights from Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and
departs from existing literature by constructing a dynamic general equilibrium model that
endogenizes the firm value at origination and its outside option and allows for aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks.7 The focus on the aggregate implications of long-term financ-
ing contracts is also shared with Cooley et al. (2004), Jermann and Quadrini (2007), and
Monge-Naranjo (2008).8 Cooley et al. (2004) study a general equilibrium model with limited
contract enforceability and analyze how aggregate shocks to technological innovation can
be amplified in the absence of market exclusion. In a similar vein, Jermann and Quadrini
(2007) investigate how these contracts shape the economy’s response following a stock mar-
ket boom or gains in productivity. Monge-Naranjo (2008) examines the effects of changes
in interest rates, but takes the firm’s outside option as exogenous. In contrast, my paper
considers the joint aggregate implications of limited enforceability and search frictions in
a general equilibrium setup, and examines how market conditions endogenously affect the
dynamics of aggregate credit supply.
While a large literature has extensively studied the importance of agency problems in credit
5Petersen and Rajan (1995), Boot and Thakor (2000), and surveys in Boot (2000) and Degryse et al.
(2009).
6Gertler (1992), Thomas and Worrall (1994), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Quadrini (2004),
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), De Marzo and Sannikov (2006), De Marzo and Fishman (2007), Biais
et al. (2010).
7For examples of contractual relationships with limited commitment and endogenous outside option in a
static setup, see Phelan (1995) and Krueger and Uhlig (2006).
8Other recent papers also related to the limited-commitment contracting model of Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn (2004) include Schmid (2012), Rampini and Viswanathan (2013), and Li et al. (2016).
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markets, little is known about the role of search frictions in this context. Previous work
(Diamond (1990), Den Haan et al. (2003), Wasmer and Weil (2004), Becsi et al. (2005))
mainly considers static random search environments with simple contracts.9 My paper
shares some insights with Den Haan et al. (2003), who highlight the lasting damage due to
the joint effects of the destruction of credit relationships and coordination failure in invest-
ment decisions. In contrast, I provide a rich and dynamic setup by embedding long-term
financing contracts within a directed search equilibrium. The property of block-recursivity
characterizing this equilibrium provides a numerically tractable solution and allows for the
introduction of aggregate shocks and the analysis of the economy’s transitional dynamics
(Menzio and Shi (2011)).
The paper also belongs to the growing theoretical literature studying the interaction between
search and agency frictions. These studies have focused mainly on labor and asset markets
as in Rudanko (2009), Guerrieri et al. (2010), Moen and Rose´n (2011), and Lamadon
(2014). In this paper, I develop a credit markets model with limited contract enforceability
and search frictions and show how the interaction between these frictions can provide novel
insights into the dynamics of credit along both intensive and extensive margins and lending
rates.
Finally, this paper complements the emerging theoretical research explaining credit market
freezes motivated by the Great Recession. This includes Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011),
who show how coordination failure among financial institutions can lead to self-fulfilling
credit contractions. Diamond and Rajan (2011) argue that the reluctance to extend credit
is related to banks’ fear of future fire sales. Benmelech and Bergman (2012) analyze the
credit channel transmission of monetary policy and show that the interplay among financial
frictions, market liquidity, and collateral values can give rise to credit traps. Philippon and
Schnabl (2013) examine the problem of efficient recapitalization when banks are subject to
9Inderst and Mu¨ller (2004) and Silviera and Wright (2006) also analyze the role of search frictions within
models of venture capital. See also Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2011) and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014), who
introduce search frictions in multiple markets simultaneously.
6
debt overhang. In contrast, my paper provides a novel “flow-driven” theory focusing on
frictions hindering the accumulation of relationship capital.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
characterizes the optimal contract, while section 4 analyzes the equilibrium properties of
credit markets. Section 5 discusses comparative statics and the general equilibrium effects
of search and limited enforceability. Sections 6 and 7 explore the quantitative properties of
the model. Section 8 examines policy implications. Section 9 provides additional extensions
and comments, and section 10 concludes.
1.2. Model
In this section, I develop a general equilibrium model of credit markets, featuring both
search and matching frictions and dynamic contracting. The contracting problem relies on
limited commitment as in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and is embedded within a
directed search equilibrium, with aggregate and bank-specific uncertainty, and where het-
erogeneous financiers compete for borrowers by posting long-term contract offers. Optimal
contracts are history-dependent and specify both loan size and corresponding interest rate
in each period of the credit relationship. The frictional meeting environment implies the
coexistence of multiple credit submarkets in which borrowers and lenders match, and where
the optimal contract offered by each bank trades off loan profitability with the probability
of finding a borrower. In equilibrium, unfunded entrepreneurs are indifferent across all ac-
tive submarkets, and the matching probability depends on the number of firms and banks
present within each submarket. Proofs are presented either within this section or in the
appendix.
1.2.1. Environment
The model is in discrete time with an infinite horizon. The economy is populated by two
types of infinitely lived agents: entrepreneurs and banks. The mass of entrepreneurs is
7
normalized to one, while the mass of active banks is determined endogenously through
entry and exit.
Agents and preferences
Both agents share the same discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Banks are risk neutral. En-
trepreneurs, on the other hand, are risk averse. They operate their firms in order to
maximize their expected lifetime utility of consumption E0[
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(dt)], where the vector
{dt}∞t=0 represents the net dividend payout consumed within each period and the flow utility
u : R → R satisfies standard regularity conditions: u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, limd→0 u′(d) = ∞, and
limd→∞ u′(d) = 0. The assumption of risk-averse entrepreneurs departs from the literature
on dynamic debt contracting, which typically assumes risk neutrality.10 This is justified
for firms whose managers derive consumption from their business venture without any abil-
ity to diversify firm-specific risk (Stulz (1984)).11 In order to ensure the model remains
tractable for both search and contracting problems, entrepreneurs are also assumed to be
hand-to-mouth and without access to a storage technology.12
Technology and shocks
Each entrepreneur has access to a production technology subject to stochastic aggregate
productivity shocks. However, she is initially cashless, and has to seek out external financ-
ing in order to start production. When funded with capital K, a project can generate
output F (z,K) = zf(K), where z is the aggregate productivity shock. The function f
is differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in capital, and satisfies f(0) = 0,
limk→0 fk(k) = +∞, and limk→∞ fk(k) = 0. The realization of the productivity shock
z ∈ Z = {z1, z2, ..., zNz} is publicly observed every period, and follows a Markov process
with transition probability Γz : Z × Z → [0, 1]. For simplicity, the production function
abstracts from labor and can be viewed as a profit function that already accounts for the
optimal choice of labor input and associated wages. When unfunded, the entrepreneur has
10Exceptions include Marcet and Marimon (1992) and Thomas and Worrall (1994).
11This is also the case for larger corporations actively engaged in risk management policies, as in Froot
et al. (1993) or Rampini and Viswanathan (2010).
12See section 9 for a discussion.
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access to a “garage” production technology generating a constant cash flow d0 per period.
The repeated interaction between borrowers and lenders can help alleviate the agency fric-
tion in place. Banks arise in this economy because they can originate and commit to
long-term financing relationships at a cost that is lower than that incurred by a repeated
sequence of short-term interactions with direct monitoring. When matched, a given bank
i acts as an intermediary channelling funds from depositors to entrepreneurs at a funding
cost rid = r¯ + s
i, where r¯ corresponds to the aggregate state of the banking sector and
si is a bank-specific spread. In this section, and to keep the theory exposition simple, I
assume that r¯ is constant while the bank-specific spread {si}i ∈ S = {s1, s2, ..., sNs} follows
independent Markov processes with transition probability Γs : S× S→ [0, 1].13
Bank heterogeneity is motivated by differences in deposit technology, competition across
deposit markets, bank size and economies of scale, too-big-to-fail subsidies, or the ability to
access interbank lending and repo markets, consistent with evidence in Berlin and Mester
(1999) and Gilchrist et al. (2013). Since the focus of the paper is on the credit allocation
process and its impact on the real economy, banks’ liability structure is modeled in a
parsimonious way, abstracting from potential feedback effects between asset quality and
funding cost. Each bank offers a long-term credit contract and serves one entrepreneur at
a time. Hence, at any given point in time, active banks can either be participating in a
lending relationship or seeking a borrower.14
Credit markets
Credit markets are decentralized and subject to search and matching frictions.15 This
assumption reflects the “localized” nature of bank lending markets (Agarwal and Hauswald
13To keep notations simple, I also define the set of bank funding shocks such that {rid}i ∈ Rd = {r¯ +
s1, r¯ + s2, ..., r¯ + sNs}, with Γrd = Γs. In the quantitative analysis section, I will allow for a more general
version of the model allowing for r¯ to be stochastic with r¯ ∈ R = {r1, r2, ..., rNr} and transition probability
Γr¯ : R×R→ [0, 1]. I will also consider a more general interpretation of the cost rid by mapping it to banks’
marginal operating cost, which accounts for both interest and non-interest expenses.
14Given that the loan origination technology is constant-return-to-scale, a bank can be thought of as a
portfolio of lending relationships sharing the same underlying funding cost.
15The costs associated with search can be viewed as either explicit (e.g., transaction costs, time spent to
prepare an application), or implicit (e.g., opportunity cost foregone when the firm remains unfunded).
9
(2010)), within which banks exert a certain degree of market power. Thus, this environment
generates situations of bilateral monopoly between borrowers and lenders, where the degree
of competition in credit markets is endogenously determined and depends on the aggregate
state of the economy. This allows for a richer and more realistic setting, as opposed to the
standard cases of perfect or monopolistic bank competition.
Credit markets are modeled using a competitive search framework in the spirit of Moen
(1997), where each bank advertises its contractual terms and where each entrepreneur di-
rects her search by applying to certain loan offers.16 Credit markets are organized as
a continuum of submarkets or market segments consisting of a subset of borrowers and
lenders and indexed by the firm value V specified by the contract. This value corresponds
to the expected net present value of dividend payouts generated throughout the lending
relationship and reflects the share of joint match surplus allocated to the firm. The orig-
ination process is costly and banks incur a cost c whenever they enter the credit market.
This parameter captures fixed operating costs related to screening applications, loan officer
wages, real estate, advertisement of bank services, or deposit creation.
The matching function m(u, v), which takes as input the mass of unfunded entrepreneurs
u and active banks v within a given submarket, implicitly accounts for congestion and
coordination externalities among borrowers and lenders and can be viewed as a reduced-form
way to capture banks’ screening technology or lending standards. The functionm is assumed
to be continuous, concave, and homogeneous of degree one in both variables. I define credit
market tightness θ = vu , the probability of getting access to credit p =
m(u,v)
u = m(1, θ) =
p(θ), and the probability of a bank locating a borrower q = m(u,v)v = q(θ). The functions
p and q are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, with p strictly increasing and
concave, q strictly decreasing and convex, and p ◦ q−1 strictly concave. Moreover, when
credit market tightness tends to zero, the probability of securing a loan and that of finding
a borrower tend to 0 and 1, respectively: limθ→0 p(θ) = 0; limθ→0 q(θ) = 1. Conversely,
16Banks are assumed to commit to the initially posted offer and cannot bargain with the firm at the
matching stage.
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when credit market tightness tends to infinity, the probability of securing a loan and that
of finding a borrower tend to 1 and 0, respectively: limθ→∞ p(θ) = 1; limθ→∞ q(θ) = 0.
Without loss of generality and as it is standard in discrete-time search models, I assume a
CES matching function with elasticity parameter γm throughout the paper.
Long-term credit contracts
Borrowers and lenders sign a state-contingent long-term credit contract upon matching. The
value of the contract at origination is determined by the aggregate state of the economy
and the characteristics of the credit search market. A lending relationship associated with
aggregate productivity z, bank funding cost rd, and capital K generates the following per-
period match surplus:
S(z, rd,K) = zf(K)− rdK.
While lenders are assumed to fully commit to established long-term contracts, borrowers
are subject to limited enforceability. A default event occurs whenever a borrower decides
to walk away with a fraction η of the existing capital stock. The diverted amount of capital
is assumed to be consumed in the same period and cannot be used for future production.17
A default also triggers the severance of the lending relationship, with defaulting borrowers
only regaining access to credit markets with a constant “fresh start” probability ξ ∈ [0, 1].
The extreme cases are obtained for ξ = 0 (permanent exclusion), or ξ = 1 (no exclusion).
Thus, this parameter governs the cost of bankruptcy and reflects legal and institutional
systems in place.18
The value of contract repudiation, which represents the firm’s outside option, is given by
17This assumption can be relaxed at the expense of increasing the dimensionality of credit submarkets.
Here, it greatly simplifies the exposition because defaulting and unfunded firms look ex-ante identical to
banks and hence follow similar credit search strategies. Note also that the model does not allow entrepreneurs
to directly switch lenders or have multiple lending relationships.
18Bebchuk (2000) relates this cost to the length of time spent on bankruptcy procedures. Efficient court
ruling, fast liquidation procedures, and a short period of discharge can therefore provide entrepreneurs with
the opportunity to move forward and potentially start up a new business venture faster (Peng et al. (2010)).
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the sum of contract-specific and aggregate components: (i) the utility value obtained from
diverting fraction η of existing capital stock, and (ii) the discounted expected firm value
after default {H(z)}z:
V O(z,K;W ) = u(ηK) + βH(z) (1.1)
H(z) = ξEz[W (z′)] + (1− ξ)(u(d0) + βEz[H(z′)]), (1.2)
where {W (z)}z represents the value of an unfunded firm in each aggregate state, as de-
termined in the directed search equilibrium, and d0 is the per-period profit derived from
“garage” production.
In order for the contract to remain enforceable along the equilibrium path, the current
firm value generated through the lending relationship should always be at least as high as
the utility derived from repudiation. The outside option and the threat of credit market
exclusion discipline the entrepreneur’s incentives and shape the dynamics of capital supplied
to firms. Moreover, the firm value after default H introduces a feedback effect between
contract dynamics and credit market conditions. The strength of such feedback is governed
by parameter ξ. Note also that full enforceability is a special case obtained for ξ = η = 0.
Eventually, long-term contracts are subject to an exogenous separation shock. With proba-
bility σ, the lending relationship is terminated. In this case, the entrepreneur loses her firm
as capital is liquidated, becomes unfunded, and starts searching for new sources of credit.
The bank, on the other hand, receives 0 until it matches with a new borrower.19 Otherwise,
the lending relationship continues with probability 1− σ.
Let ωτt = {(zt, rd,t), (zt+1, rd,t+1), .., (zτ , rd,τ )} denote the history of shocks associated with
an ongoing lending relationship starting from date t and state ωt = (zt, rd,t), and remaining
in place up to period τ . A long-term contract is a set of policies for capital Kτ and dividend
19The bank does not receive any income once the lending relationship is severed. In addition, the search
for a new borrower is costly, and would also deliver 0 profits ex-ante due to bank free-entry condition.
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payout dτ :
C(ω) = {(Kτ (ωτt ), dτ (ωτt ), ∀ ωτ , τ = t, ..,∞ s.t. ω = ωt}.
Timing
Figure 1 displays the model timeline, which comprises two main stages, each divided into
two steps. First is the origination stage (extensive margin) involving (i) bank entry, and
(ii) credit search and matching. Second is the dynamic contracting stage (intensive margin)
involving (iii) capital intermediation, and (iv) firm production or default. The realization of
aggregate productivity z, bank funding cost rd, and separation shocks are public information
observed by both borrowers and lenders.
Figure 1: Timeline
Lending rel. is terminated
Firm returns to credit markets
Bank receives 0
σ
1-σ
zt r
i
d,t
Lending rel. is not terminated
Capital is advanced
Origination stage
Bank entry Search and matching
Dynamic contracting stage
Firm diverts capital
Lending rel. is severed
Firm produces, pays back interest
Lending rel. continues
• Bank entry: following the realization of aggregate shocks, banks pay cost c in order
to enter credit markets.
• Credit search and matching: following the realization of their idiosyncratic shock,
banks decide to become active by posting loan offers or to stay idle. Unfunded en-
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trepreneurs search and apply for credit opportunities within the active submarkets.
Upon approval of the loan application, a bank-firm pair is formed and a long-term
financing contract specifying the allocation of surplus between the two agents (and,
hence, the evolution of contractual terms) is signed.
• Capital intermediation: Capital is intermediated within ongoing bank-firm pairs that
did not experience an exogenous separation shock, as prescribed by the financing
contract.
• Firm production/default: In case of default, entrepreneurs divert and consume frac-
tion η of capital K, and face a per-period probability of exclusion 1 − ξ from credit
markets following that. Otherwise, they use capital for production and consume div-
idend payout d (or, equivalently, pay back interest rate r to the bank), as prescribed
by the financing contract.
1.3. Optimal contracts
In this section, I characterize the optimal long-term financing contract in a partial equilib-
rium setting, taking as given both firm value V at origination and the vector of unfunded
firm values {W (z)}z for each aggregate state. These objects will be endogenously deter-
mined when I characterize the credit search market.
1.3.1. Intuition
Let us develop the general intuition behind this problem before moving to the analytical
characterization. With full commitment on both sides, capital allocation is always first-best,
meaning that it always maximizes the per-period match surplus independent of any con-
straint. However, the first-best allocation of capital cannot be generally achieved because
the entrepreneur retains the option of not repaying the debt, being temporarily excluded
from the credit market, and, eventually, searching for a new financier. The entrepreneurs’
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participation constraint limits the amount of capital that can be lent. This limit is endoge-
nous because the value to the entrepreneur of remaining in the relationship depends on the
future terms of trade and the value of leaving the relationship depends on the aggregate
credit market conditions.
As in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), these distortions are minimized within an op-
timal default-free contract that features — abstracting from aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks — terms of trade that become more and more favorable to the entrepreneur. In-
tuitively, by offering a contract with terms of trade that improve over time rather than
remain constant, the bank can relax the entrepreneur’s participation constraint in the fu-
ture (and, hence, lend more capital) without affecting the current participation constraint.
The limit to backloading comes from the fact that the entrepreneur is averse to risk and,
hence, dislikes consumption paths that are too steep.
Most important, by taking into account the repeated interaction between banks and en-
trepreneurs, the model endogenizes borrowing limits. These limits are not an exogenous
and constant fraction of the value of the entrepreneur’s collateral, but are an endogenous
variable that depends on credit market conditions at origination, the history of the rela-
tionship between bank and entrepreneur, and the state of the economy.
1.3.2. Contracting problem
The optimal contract maximizes the expected discounted payments to the bank, subject
to the promise-keeping, participation, and limited liability constraints. I first write this
contractual problem in its recursive form using the firm value V as a state variable in the
spirit of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Abreu et al. (1990).
To simplify notations, the value of the contract to the bank is written as B(z, rd, V ) =
B(z, rd, V ;W ) taking the equilibrium object W as given, and the dependence of the con-
tinuation values {V ′}z′,rd′ on (z′, r′d) is implicitly considered. The recursive formulation of
the problem is as follows:
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B(z, rd, V ) = max
K,d,{V ′}
zf(K)− d− rdK + βEz,rd
[
(1− σ)B(z′, r′d, V ′)
]
subject to
V = u(d) + βEz,rd
[
(1− σ)V ′ + σW (z′)] , (Promise-Keeping)
V O(z,K;W ) ≤ V, (Participation)
d ≥ 0. (Limited Liability)
(1.3)
The control variables are capital K, firm profits d, and vector of continuation values
{V ′}z′,rd′ . The promise-keeping constraint represents the bank’s full commitment to de-
liver value V , which accounts for today’s utility from payout u(d), and the discounted
promised value βEz,rd [(1− σ)V ′ + σW (z′)]. The second inequality is the participation or
enforcement constraint. In order for the contract to be self-enforcing, this constraint re-
quires that the value of staying V is always at least as high as the firm’s outside option.
Eventually, the contract assumes the firm’s payout to be non-negative, reflecting the en-
trepreneur’s limited liability. As in Cooley et al. (2004), this assumption is justified by the
fact that entrepreneurial consumption cannot be negative when the bank is the only source
of financing and all of the entrepreneur’s assets are inside the firm.20
1.3.3. Recursive multiplier formulation
The forward-looking nature of the enforcement constraint and the existence of persistent
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks make this problem difficult to solve using standard dy-
namic programming techniques. Thus, I adapt the methodology developed in Marcet and
Marimon (2011) and transform the problem into a saddle-point dynamic program. Here,
instead of solving the problem in the value space, the problem is rewritten in its recursive La-
grangian form, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the current enforcement
constraint and Λ is the cumulative Lagrangian (i.e., the sum of past Lagrange multipliers)
20This is, for example, the case when outside investment opportunities are assumed to yield lower returns
and hence are not held in equilibrium.
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representing the relative weight associated with firm value V within the planner’s prob-
lem. By introducing the expectational constraint directly into the objective function, this
formulation circumvents the time-inconsistency issue present in the original maximization
problem, since it imposes a certain law of motion for Λ.21
Given model assumptions, Theorems 1 and 2 in Marcet and Marimon (2011) justify the
equivalence between the original problem and its saddle-point transformation when sepa-
ration is exogenous. This formulation will be extremely useful in order to characterize the
main properties of the optimal contract and compute a numerical solution.
Proposition 1. The maximization problem (1.3) is equivalent to the saddle-point problem:
P (z, rd,Λ) = infλ supK,d zf(K)− d− rdK − λ [u(ηK) + βH(z)]
+(Λ + λ)
[
u(d) + βσEz[W (z′)]
]
+β(1− σ)Ez,rd
[
P (z′, r′d,Λ + λ)
]
subject to
d ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0. (1.4)
The value of the cumulative Lagrangian Λ is strictly increasing — independent of shock
realizations — as long as the firm’s participation constraint remains binding (i.e., λ > 0).
Its law of motion is given by Λ′ = Λ + λ, and can be interpreted as an additional condition
that the planner imposes in order for the contract to follow the optimal path. From the
envelope condition, it is straightforward to show that the marginal cost to the bank of a
one-unit increase in firm value is equalized across all possible continuation states (z, rd):
∂B(z, rd, V (z, rd))
∂V
= −Λ. (1.5)
21Cooley et al. (2004) also use this technique to solve a similar problem.
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1.3.4. Characterization
Capital policy
The optimal choice of capital K∗ is static. Indeed, K∗ solves the following intermediate
problem, which depends only on firm value V and current shock realizations:
pi(z, rd, V ) = max
K
zf(K)− rdK (1.6)
subject to u(ηK) + βH(z) ≤ V.
This problem generates a constrained region where the enforcement condition binds and
the level of working capital is suboptimal, and an unconstrained region where the first-best
level of capital KFB is defined for each state (z, rd) as:
KFB(z, rd) = arg max
K
zf(K)− rdK.
Let us also define V¯ (z, rd) as the lowest continuation value associated with a non-binding
participation constraint:
V¯ (z, rd) = u(ηKFB(z, rd)) + βH(z),
and the constrained level of capital K¯(z, V ), satisfying V O(z, K¯;W ) = V for V < V¯ (z, rd).
22
Proposition 2. The firm’s optimal capital K∗ is characterized by:
K∗(z, rd, V ) =
 K¯(z, V ), if V < V¯ (z, rd),KFB(z, rd), if V ≥ V¯ (z, rd).
.
22Note that for each state (z, rd), the upper bound of the cumulative Lagrangian Λ¯(z, rd) is reached
whenever the firm value is V¯ (z, rd). It is given by:
∂B(z,rd,V¯ (z,rd))
∂V
= −Λ¯(z, rd).
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Corollary 1. K∗ is decreasing in ξ, η and W in the constrained region, all else equal.
The above corollary is intuitive, since the limited commitment problem becomes more severe
as the outside option increases. Given that an increase in the share of diverted capital η,
the probability of fresh start ξ, or the unfunded firm value W implies a larger outside
option, the financier lowers the amount of capital advanced to prevent the entrepreneur
from running away. The links among the firm’s equity value, capital allocation, and market
conditions are apparent from the above expression. The higher the firm value V , the higher
its capital allocation K. However, a higher W distorts the contract further and leads to a
lower allocation.23
Dividend payout policy
The following proposition shows that the dividend payout d exhibits downward rigidity;
in other words, d is never decreasing, and either increases whenever the participation con-
straint is binding (λ > 0) or stays constant once the unconstrained region is reached.
Proposition 3. Dividend payout increases over time whenever the firm’s participation
constraint is binding.
This result is driven by the following envelope condition, which exhibits the positive relation
between d and V since u′ > 0, and their link to the cumulative Lagrangian Λ′:
1
u′(d)
= −∂B(z
′, r′d, Vz′,r′d)
∂V
= Λ′. (1.7)
The dividend payout increases in Λ′. A higher degree of risk aversion is accompanied by a
relatively smoother path of dividend payouts.24 This contrasts with the risk-neutral case,
23Note also that two firms with same value V , but linked to banks with different funding costs such that
rd,1 < rd,2, receive the same amount of credit as long as V < V¯ (z, rd,2).
24The backloaded dividend dynamics are analogous to the ones obtained in standard dynamic contracting
problems with limited commitment as in Harris and Holmstrom (1982), in which a risk-neutral financier is
indeed providing insurance to risk-averse borrowers. The difference vis-a-vis labor models with limited com-
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wherein the entrepreneur is indifferent about the timing of consumption, and in which it is
always optimal to reinvest all proceeds in the firm in order to grow out of the constrained
region faster. In the continuation region, the law of motion for dividends is given by:
1
u′(d′)
=
1
u′(d)
+ λ.
Effective intra-temporal interest rate
The contract implicitly specifies an effective intra-temporal interest rate charged to borrow-
ers as a function of the optimal capital and dividend payout policies. It is given by:25
r∗(z, rd, V ) =
zf(K∗(z, rd, V ))− d∗(z, rd, V )
K∗(z, rd, V )
.
Firm value dynamics
Now that we have characterized the relationship among equity value, capital, and dividend
payout, we can turn to the analysis of the dynamic aspect of the contract. I show that, first,
in the absence of shocks, firm value is always increasing in the constrained region. This
generalizes the result shown in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) for the risk-neutral
case and confirms that the incentives to save in order to outgrow the borrowing constraints
are still present despite the consumption smoothing motive.26 Second, the introduction of
shocks implies that firm value can now follow a non-monotonic pattern.
Proposition 4. Fix (z, rd). For a given firm value V , the continuation value V
′ increases
over time whenever V < V¯ (z, rd).
mitment (Rudanko (2009)) comes from the agency problem faced by borrowers, which generates additional
savings incentives and different payout dynamics.
25Note, however, that the implementation of the contract is not unique.
26Marcet and Marimon (1992) also feature a dynamic contracting problem with risk-averse agents and
limited commitment in a different context.
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Keeping aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks constant, the cumulative Lagrangian (and,
hence, firm value) increases whenever the participation constraint is binding. Hence, V ′ > V
because B is a decreasing function of V . This result follows directly from the one for div-
idend payout (since V is the net present value of future dividends) and can be directly
generalized to the expectation of promised values when the economy is subject to shocks.
Proposition 5. Fix z. For a given firm value V and funding cost rd, the continuation
value V ′(z, r′d) decreases in r
′
d whenever V < V¯ (z, rd).
This proposition relates to firm dynamics in the cross-section. It states that banks with
relatively low funding costs offer higher continuation values, all else equal. This is intuitive,
since lending relationships established with low-funding-cost banks generate a larger match
surplus, given that the marginal product of capital is lower, and as a consequence allow
firms to receive larger capital allocations and dividends. Figure 2 illustrates how capital,
dividends, and continuation values {V ′} depend on current firm value V and funding costs,
holding aggregate shocks constant and taking both firm value at origination and the vector
associated with unfunded firm value {W (z)}z in each aggregate state as given.27
Figure 2: Contract policies
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Notes. Contract policies as a function of firm value V , for low (green), intermediate (red), and high (blue)
levels of funding cost: capital K, firm payout d, continuation values V ′.
27Note that continuation values {V ′} depend on both current and future funding costs. For simplicity,
the continuation value profiles shown in the right-hand panel correspond to the case in which the current
funding cost is at the intermediate level.
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The dynamics of the firm’s capital, dividend payout, and value can eventually be summa-
rized as follows. Upon matching, the newly formed lending relationship starts with an initial
firm value V0, which depends on credit market conditions determined in general equilibrium.
The firm typically starts with a limited borrowing capacity and operates at a suboptimal
scale as long as its participation constraint is binding.
Throughout time, the participation constraint gets relaxed and the firm gets allocated more
capital as its value increases. In this setup, entrepreneurs care about the time allocation
of dividend payments because they are risk averse. The optimal contract therefore allows
for positive dividend payouts even in the constrained region in order to generate a smooth
consumption profile. The lending relationship eventually matures whenever V becomes
sufficiently large to sustain the first-best level of capital across all possible future states.
The dynamics of the contractual terms and the speed at which the firm reaches the un-
constrained region are in particular shaped by the curvature of the entrepreneur’s utility
function and the general equilibrium forces impacting the firm’s outside option.
1.4. Directed search equilibrium
I now introduce the general equilibrium version of the model. I first characterize the credit
search environment, and then address the ways in which aggregate market conditions en-
dogenously impact contract dynamics. The interaction between agency and search frictions
affects the firm value in both funded and unfunded stages and generates novel implica-
tions. Moreover, directed search provides a framework that is tractable and amenable to
the introduction of heterogeneous agents and persistent shocks, thanks to the property
of block-recursivity of the equilibrium. Let us start by analyzing the search behavior of
borrowers and lenders separately.
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1.4.1. Problem of unfunded firms
In order to resume production, entrepreneurs search for credit opportunities whenever they
are unfunded. Let W = {W (z)}z denote the vector associated with the unfunded firm value
(or reservation value) for each aggregate state z. The Bellman equation of W (z) satisfies:
W (z) = u(d0) + βρ(z) + βEz[W (z′)] (1.8)
ρ(z) = p(θ(z, V ))(V − Ez[W (z′)]), ∀ V (1.9)
where ρ(z) denotes the added firm value derived from forming a lending relationship times
the probability of a match, and θ(z, V ) is the credit market tightness associated with the
submarket delivering firm value V . We can rearrange the two expressions above to establish
the link between market tightness and firm value as follows:
p(θ(z, V )) =
W (z)− u(d0)− βEz[W (z′)]
β(V − Ez[W (z′)]) . (1.10)
This expression determines a bijective mapping between firm value V and credit market
tightness θ(z, V ) within each submarket. Given that the function p is strictly increasing in θ,
it follows that θ is strictly decreasing in V . This means that credit submarkets where banks
offer contracts with relatively low firm value have higher matching probability. Thus, they
are more liquid in the sense that they feature higher approval rates and faster relationship
creation. In contrast, submarkets where banks offer contracts with relatively high firm value
have lower credit market tightness and lower approval rates.
Eventually, for each aggregate state z, any credit submarket offering a contract with firm
value below the reservation value W (z) cannot attract borrowers and is therefore inactive.
Figure 3 shows borrowers’ indifference curve across active submarkets in the (p(θ), V ) space.
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Figure 3: Relationship between approval rates and firm value
V(ϴ)
W
V
p(ϴ)10
1.4.2. Problem of banks
Banks decide whether to enter credit markets after the realization of the aggregate shock,
but before observing the idiosyncratic component of their funding cost. If the funding cost
is not sufficiently low to warrant gains from trade, the bank stays idle and does not offer
any lending opportunity. This is the case when B(z, rd,W (z);W ) ≤ 0, which means the
lending contract cannot simultaneously deliver a firm value above its reservation W and
positive bank profits. Otherwise, each active bank optimally chooses the submarket that
maximizes its expected profits, taking into account the probability of finding a borrower,
given the reservation value W :
V ∗(z, rd;W ) = arg max
V
q(θ(z, V ))B(z, rd, V ;W ). (1.11)
Let us define the compact interval S0 = [S, S¯], where S = u(d0)1−β , and S¯ is the maximum
value obtained by the entrepreneur when the joint match surplus is kept entirely inside the
firm.
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Lemma 1. The solution V ∗(z, rd;W ) to the maximization problem (1.11) exists and is
unique for each (z, rd,W ) ∈ Z× Rd × S0.
As in Moen (1997), the solution V ∗(z, rd;W ) corresponds to the tangency point between
firms’ indifference condition and each active bank’s objective function.
1.4.3. Free entry
Because a loan offer is posted only if it provides positive profits to the bank, we can define
the expected bank profits prior to entry as:
B∗(z;W ) = E
[(
q(θ(z, V ∗(z, rd;W )))B(z, rd, V ∗(z, rd;W );W )
)
+
]
, (1.12)
where the expectation is taken over all possible bank funding states.
The conditions for free entry and complementary slackness are as follows:
c = B∗(z;W ), (1.13)
0 = θ(z, V )[B∗(z;W )− c], ∀ V. (1.14)
The free-entry condition (1.13) states that banks keep posting new loan offers as long as
the ex-ante profits from credit origination are at least equal to the cost c. Condition (1.14)
is the standard complementary slackness condition, which specifies the set of active (θ > 0)
and inactive (θ = 0) submarkets.
As is common in this class of search models, the free-entry condition, combined with positive
bank entry in each state of the economy, is critical to ensure that the equilibrium is block-
recursive and tractable for the analysis of transitional dynamics. Without such conditions,
agents in this economy would need to forecast the evolution of the distribution of bank-firm
pairs in order to determine the dynamics of credit market tightness in each submarket, in
the spirit of Krusell and Smith (1998). Here, this allows the equilibrium market tightness
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to be independent of the distribution of banks, since agents already anticipate that credit
relationships are formed until the free-entry condition is satisfied with equality.
1.4.4. Equilibrium
Characterization of credit markets
The following lemma states that each bank type chooses its optimal submarket, indexed by
firm value V , that maximizes its expected profits from posting a loan offer. Whenever it is
active, the optimal submarket associated with each bank funding level is unique.
Lemma 2. xx
(i) For a sufficiently small cost c, a solution W satisfying the free entry condition (equation
1.13) exists and is unique.
(ii) The added value obtained from searching for a loan contract, ρ(z) is equalized across all
active submarkets. There is an optimal firm value V ∗(z, rd) ∀ (z, rd) ∈ Z× Rd such that:
(a) Each active submarket V ∗(z, rd) satisfies θ(z, V ∗(z, rd)) > 0, with
p(θ(z, V ∗(z, rd)))(V ∗(z, rd)− Ez[W (z′)]) = ρ(z).
(b) For a given rd and expected bank profits
B¯(z, rd, V
∗(z, rd)) = q(θ(z, V ∗(z, rd)))B(z, rd, V ∗(z, rd)),
we have:
θ(z, V ∗(z, rd)) =
 0 , if B¯(z, rd, V
∗(z, rd)) ≤ 0,
q−1
( B¯(z,rd,V ∗(z,rd))
B(z,rd,V ∗(z,rd))
)
, if B¯(z, rd, V
∗(z, rd)) > 0.
In equilibrium, all active submarkets offer the same ex-ante value ρ(z) and borrowers are
indifferent across all of them. Indeed, unfunded entrepreneurs keep entering a given sub-
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market until the probability of finding a credit opportunity becomes so low that they would
eventually prefer applying and accepting less generous contractual terms from other banks.
Proposition 6. Credit markets in the cross-section
• V ∗(z, rd) and capital level at origination K0(z, rd) decrease with rd.
• p(θ(z, V ∗(z, rd)) increases with rd.
Figure 4 summarizes the main equilibrium properties of these markets. The introduction
of search frictions provides a natural and realistic equilibrium setting that allows for the
coexistence of multiple loan offers with different contractual terms. It also characterizes the
link between contractual terms and the extensive margin of credit. In particular, approval
rates are inversely related to both application rates and offered firm values. Banks with low
funding costs have a higher opportunity cost if they cannot locate borrowers within a given
period. Thus, they offer higher firm value (and, hence, more generous contractual terms)
to attract borrowers faster. As a result, firms applying to these banks face a larger number
of competing applicants and thus a lower approval rate relative to high-funding banks.
Figure 4: Approval rates and contractual terms in the cross-section
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As a corollary, when credit markets are liquid and the degree of bank competition is high
(i.e., unfunded firm reservation value W is high), banks with high funding costs may not
find lending profitable and, hence, they are deterred from entering credit markets.
I now turn to the definition of the directed search equilibrium and establish its existence.
Definition 1. Directed search equilibrium
A directed search equilibrium of the economy consists of: the value for unfunded {W (z)}z
and funded {V (z, rd)}z,rd firms, market tightness {θ(z, V )}z, and loan contract policies
{(K∗, d∗, V ′∗)}z,rd , such that:
a. Credit search strategy of unfunded firms is optimal. That is, the added value provided
by a lending contract is consistent with equation (1.8), and the relationship between this
value and market tightness satisfies equation (1.10).
b. Bank lending policy is optimal. Given {W (z)}z, and for all z and rd, banks maximize
their profits by solving problem (1.3).
c. Bank entry is consistent with free entry condition (1.13), and is strictly positive for all
aggregate states z.
d. Measure of unfunded firms in the economy evolves according to:
υt = υt−1
(
1− (1− σ)
∑
rd
Γ0rd(rd)p(θ(z, Vrd))
)
+ (1− υt−1)σ
where Γ0rd is the unconditional distribution of the idiosyncratic funding cost at entry, and
Vrd = V
∗(z, rd) is the optimal submarket associated with bank type rd.
.
Proposition 7. A directed search equilibrium exists for a sufficiently small cost c.
This proposition establishes the existence of a solution consistent with the definition of a
directed search equilibrium. Note that this equilibrium solution is well defined — in the
sense that it allows for block-recursivity — only when bank entry is strictly positive across
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all possible histories of the states of the economy.
1.4.5. Efficiency
Let us introduce the social planner’s problem in order to analyze the efficiency of the
directed search equilibrium defined above. The social planner maximizes the discounted
sum of utilities derived by banks and firms across all incumbent credit relationships, in
addition to the utility derived by unfunded entrepreneurs, minus total origination costs.
The problem is subject to the dynamics of existing contracts represented by the function fc
(which depends only on (Vt−1, rd,t−1, rd,t)), and the laws of motion of the mass of unfunded
firms υt and the distribution of credit relationships gt.
To simplify notations, and without loss of generality, I abstract from aggregate shocks. Also,
the social planner faces the same contracting frictions as each individual bank. Hence, I can
immediately replace the original problem with the corresponding solution to its Lagrange
multiplier formulation, by taking the optimal weights associated with the firm value to be
Λt+1 =
1
u′(dt) . The social planner therefore maximizes the following objective function:
max
υt,gt,θV ,Jt,Vt
E
∑
t
βt
[ ∑
rd,t,Vt
gt(rd,t, Vt) [S(rd,t, Vt)− d(Vt) + Λt+1(rd,t, Vt)u(d(Vt))]
−cJt + υtu(d0)
]
s.t. ∀ (t, zt)
Λt+1(rd,t, Vt) =
1
u′(d(Vt))
, ∀ (rd,t, Vt)
Vt = fc(Vt−1, rt−1, rt), ∀ (Vt−1, rt−1, rt)
υt = υt−1
(
1− (1− σ)
∑
r
Γ0rd(r)p(θVr )
)
+ (1− υt−1)σ
gt(r, V ) =
∑
Vt−1|Vt=V
(1− σ)gt−1(rt−1, Vt−1)Γrd(rt−1, r) + Jtq(θVr )Γ0rd(r)1Vr=V ,∀ (r, V ),
where Γrd is the transition probability, Γ
0
rd
is the unconditional distribution of the idiosyn-
cratic funding cost at entry, and Vrd is the optimal submarket chosen by the bank with
funding cost rd.
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Proposition 8. Whenever it exists, the directed search equilibrium is constrained inefficient
when entrepreneurs are risk averse. When entrepreneurs are risk neutral, the directed search
equilibrium is unique and delivers the efficient allocation.
Proposition 8 shows the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the planner’s problem
and establishes that the corresponding allocation coincides with that of the directed search
equilibrium only if entrepreneurs are risk neutral. The equilibrium inefficiency is due to the
combination of risk-averse entrepreneurs and search frictions in credit markets, and gen-
eralizes the results obtained by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Golosov et al. (2013) in
the context of labor markets. In particular, it states that credit-rationed entrepreneurs are
inefficiently “impatient” and choose to apply for loans in markets that offer low firm values
but high approval rates. Thus, banks offer insurance to these risk-averse and unfunded
borrowers by supplying such loan contracts. As a result, capital is allocated at an ineffi-
ciently fast rate and the market share associated with high-funding-cost banks is too high.
This result is interesting because it provides new grounds for a theory of inefficient lend-
ing relying on credit search frictions and leaves room for novel forms of policy intervention.28
1.5. General equilibrium effects of search and limited enforceability
This section illustrates the general equilibrium effects generated by the key parameters
governing contract dynamics (i.e., share of divertible capital η and probability of fresh start
ξ) and credit origination (i.e., matching elasticity γm and origination costs c). In particular,
I investigate how the interaction between search and agency frictions operates through both
intensive and extensive margins of credit and explore its implications at the aggregate level.
First, the contracting parameters impact the extensive margin of credit in that a tighter
participation constraint (i.e., higher η and ξ) slows down firms’ ability to outgrow their
borrowing constraint. Thus, it limits the total match surplus and negatively impacts bank
28A further theoretical investigation of this result, and its consequences on bank lending markets and the
real economy, is left for future research.
30
entry, credit market tightness, matching probabilities, and firm value at origination. Second,
search parameters not only affect the extensive margin of credit, but also shape the dynamics
of incumbent lending relationships due to the feedback effect operating through the outside
option. For example, highly liquid credit markets (i.e., markets with low search frictions,
with low c or high γm) can generate further distortions in the contract by tightening the
borrowing constraint more and slowing down capital intermediation.
1.5.1. Comparative statics
Contract parameters η and ξ
Parameters η and ξ enter directly in the firm’s outside option and have qualitatively similar
effects on both extensive and intensive margins. These parameters, however, govern two
distinct aspects: η affects the relationship-specific component of the outside option (i.e.,
growth rate of firm as a function of their current level of capital), whereas ξ governs the
sensitivity of credit growth rate to aggregate shocks.
Share of divertible assets η. The share of divertible capital η captures the entrepreneur’s
default incentives. A higher diversion rate amplifies the agency problem and severely dis-
torts the contract. As a consequence, the total surplus extracted from the match and the
firm value at origination are also lower.
Figure 5 shows how η impacts several variables of interest. The top left-hand-side panel
shows the firm value both at contract origination V0 and when unfunded W . Both variables
decrease with η, as the agency problem becomes more severe and the joint match surplus
decreases. The wedge between V0 and W depends on the approval rates shown in the top
right-hand-side panel, and widens with η as firms’ ability to access credit declines. The
bottom panels compare the evolution of contractual terms for low and high η. Given that
they offer a higher firm value at origination, environments with limited agency frictions
(i.e., low η) allow firms to start at higher levels of capital and lower interest rates. As a
result, the first-best allocation of capital is also attained at a faster rate.
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Figure 5: Comparative statics - η
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Fresh start probability ξ. The fresh start probability ξ reflects the entrepreneurs’ ability
to access credit markets after default. The inverse of ξ is the average period of exclusion
and can be viewed as a measure of the degree of leniency of the bankruptcy code toward
entrepreneurs. A higher fresh-start probability allows for a shorter exclusion from credit
markets, raises the outside option of the borrower, and further distorts the contracting
problem.29 This parameter also captures the quality of legal institutions and the speed at
which bankruptcy procedures are dealt with. The comparative statics are consistent with
the studies of La Porta et al. (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998) which show that economies
with more entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy laws typically exhibit lower access to credit.
29The comparative statics for ξ are reported in Figure 15 in the appendix.
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Search parameters γm and c
I now turn to exploring the effects of parameters linked to search in credit markets. Higher
matching elasticity γm and lower origination costs c yield the same qualitative features of
credit markets, namely, more liquid markets with a higher approval rate and firm value.
In this context, the degree of competition in credit markets is captured by the equilibrium
market tightness θ, which is the ratio of loan offers to applications.30 The model thus
provides interesting dynamics for contractual terms, whereas increased bank competition
actually implies lower credit availability and higher interest rates at origination. However,
such effects get reversed throughout the lending relationship as the agency problem becomes
less severe and the feedback effect weakens.
Matching elasticity γm. The matching elasticity parameter governs the degree of match-
ing frictions in credit markets. The following comparative statics show that markets with
a high degree of competition typically generate higher approval rates and better access
to credit. This is consistent with evidence from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey
(SLOOS) conducted by the Federal Reserve Board, which reports that competition among
lenders is often highlighted as one of the major reasons for easing lending standards.31
The bottom right panel of Figure 6, which highlights how interest rates vary throughout a
relationship for both low and high degrees of competition, is also qualitatively consistent
with the empirical results in Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Santos and Winton (2013).32
Origination cost c. Decreasing c provides similar qualitative results. From the free-entry
condition, we can see that a lower value of c is accompanied by more bank entry, producing
easier access to credit and larger unfunded firm value W in equilibrium.33
30Inderst and Mu¨ller (2004) provide a similar interpretation.
31“Among domestic respondents that reported having eased either standards or terms on C&I loans over
the past three months, the majority of banks cited more-aggressive competition from other banks or nonbank
lenders as an important reason for having done so.” - Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices, January 2014: www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnloanSurvey/201402/.
32Note that Petersen and Rajan (1994) look at firm age instead of relationship length.
33The comparative statics for c are reported in Figure 16 in the appendix.
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Figure 6: Comparative statics - γm
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
γ
m
70
80
90
100
110
Fi
rm
 v
al
ue
V0
W
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
γ
m
0
10
20
30
40
A
pp
ro
va
l r
at
e 
%
0 10 20 30
quarters
0
20
40
60
80
Ca
pi
ta
l
0 10 20 30
quarters
5
10
15
20
25
In
te
re
st
 ra
te
 %
low γ
m
high γ
m
The origination cost c can be interpreted in several ways. First, it can be viewed as an initial
sunk investment needed to start up the firm’s project. The above result can therefore provide
grounds for potentially explaining why entrepreneurs seeking lower levels of financing have
relatively higher approval rates. Second, it can be associated with screening costs at the
bank level. In this case, the model predicts that lower screening costs materialized, for
example by online lending, technological progress, or the adoption of credit scoring, would
thus imply a faster creation of lending relationships but a potentially slower credit growth
at the bank-firm level.
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1.5.2. Aggregate implications: trade-off between extensive and intensive mar-
gins and the speed of credit allocation
The model implications at the lending relationship level do not necessarily apply at the
macroeconomic level. Indeed, the interaction between search and agency frictions implies a
clear trade-off between intensive and extensive margins of credit. On the one hand, a high
degree of credit market liquidity or bank competition would indeed lead to higher approval
rates and more creation of lending relationships. On the other hand, this would also generate
a higher outside option for the borrower, and hence further contract distortions and lower
initial capital allocation at the bank-firm level.
Let us illustrate how both extensive and intensive margins affect the aggregate dynamics
of bank credit and the speed of credit allocation through the following experiment. Figure
7 shows the evolution of aggregate credit following the destruction of 100% of lending
relationships, for two economies with different degrees of search frictions (the case where c
tends to 0 refers to low search and perfect competition) and fresh-start probability ξ.
Figure 7: General equilibrium effects and credit allocation
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Parameter ξ governs the strength of the feedback effect from credit markets to individual
loan contracts and turns out to be an important determinant of the speed of credit allo-
cation. Indeed, as ξ tends to 0, the feedback effect becomes muted, and both agency and
search frictions combine in a positive way to generate very slow recoveries. This is the case
where the extensive margin effect due to search frictions dominates. Conversely, when ξ is
sufficiently high, the feedback effect becomes strong enough so that search frictions actually
help mitigate agency frictions. This ultimately generates faster capital allocations as the
outside option becomes small. This is the case where the intensive margin effect dominates.
In light of this result, it is therefore important to recognize that policies aimed at increasing
bank competition in the aftermath of financial crises can actually slow down credit recovery
instead of boosting it. This is particularly relevant when the general equilibrium forces
described above are strong, as may be the case for economies with relatively weak investor
protection or bankruptcy laws that are “too” entrepreneur-friendly.
1.5.3. Empirical predictions
The model provides theoretical insights at both micro and macro levels, which can be tested
empirically. These model predictions relate mainly to the dynamics of lending relationships,
credit markets and bank competition, and institutional environment.
Lending relationships
• Credit availability and pricing improve with the length of the lending relationship.
• Credit availability is higher and increases at a relatively faster rate for firms matched
with low-funding banks.
Credit markets
• Cross-section. Banks with low funding costs have higher application rates and lower
approval rates. They also offer better contractual terms, since they provide greater
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access to credit and charge lower interest rates throughout the lending relationship.
• Business cycle. Access to credit is more difficult during downturns. The degree of
bank competition and approval rates are countercyclical.
Bank competition
• Bank competition generates higher approval rates and increases the creation rate of
lending relationships (i.e., less credit rationing at the extensive margin), but decreases
the amount of credit available at origination (i.e., more credit rationing at the intensive
margin).
• Controlling for bank type, bank competition increases the dispersion of interest rates
across borrowers. Controlling for the length of the lending relationship, bank compe-
tition decreases the dispersion of interest rates offered across banks.
Legal environment
• Economies with more entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy laws have higher levels of
credit rationing at both intensive and extensive margins.
• Credit availability and interest rates improve at slower rates in these economies.
1.6. Quantitative analysis
I now move to the analysis of the quantitative properties of the model and its application
to commercial lending. I first specify the functional forms associated with the model and
calibrate its parameters, and then evaluate its steady-state and business-cycle properties.
Next, I examine the response of the economy to aggregate bank funding and productivity
shocks, to show how the propagation mechanism operates through the extensive margin
of credit, and highlight the asymmetric impact across borrowers. Finally, I run policy
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experiments and analyze the effects of subsidies to origination costs and bank funding.
1.6.1. Model specification
I specify the firm-level profit function to be of the general form F (z,K) = zKα − kf , with
decreasing returns to scale parameter α and fixed cost kf .
34 I set the period utility of
entrepreneurs to be CRRA of the form u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ with coefficient of relative risk aversion
γ. I also assume a CES matching function with elasticity γm. This function generates the
following meeting probabilities:
p(θ) = θ(1 + θγm)
− 1
γm ,
q(θ) = (1 + θγm)
− 1
γm .
In this numerical exercise, I now generalize the theoretical model specified in the previous
section and allow for two aggregate shocks, namely productivity z and common component
of bank funding r¯, in addition to the idiosyncratic component of bank funding s. The
aggregate log-productivity follows an AR(1) process:
log(zt+1) = (1− ρz) log(z¯) + ρz log(zt) + σzt+1,  ∼ N (0, 1).
Similarly, the aggregate and idiosyncratic components of the bank funding cost follow AR(1)
processes:
r¯t+1 = (1− ρr)r¯0 + ρrr¯t + σrνrt+1, νr ∼ N (0, 1),
st+1 = ρsst + σsν
s
t+1, ν
s ∼ N (0, 1).
The process innovations {t}t and {νrt }t are assumed to be uncorrelated. Similarly, the in-
novations for idiosyncratic shocks {νsi,t}i,t are uncorrelated with respect to aggregate coun-
34Introducing a fixed cost does not affect any of the theoretical results.
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terparts and are independent across banks. Eventually, the distribution of bank-specific
cost shocks at entry Γ0rd is uniform over the interval [−σs,entry, σs,entry].
All processes are approximated using a finite grid with five shock realizations for aggregate
productivity (Nz = 5) and seven shock realizations for both aggregate (Nr¯ = 7) and bank-
specific (Ns = 7) funding components following the discretization methodology of Tauchen
and Hussey (1991).
1.6.2. Calibration
The calibration exercise relies on the simulated method of moments (SMM). I set the length
of a period in the model to one quarter. I need to assign values to the following set
of model parameters {β, α, γ, σ, ξ, η, c, γm, d0, kf}, in addition to the parameters governing
productivity and bank funding shocks {z¯, ρz, σz, r¯0, ρr, σr, ρs, σs, σs,entry}.
In the baseline estimation, I pre-calibrate four model parameters. The discount rate β is set
to 0.9875, which corresponds to an annual real interest rate of about 5%. The coefficient
of relative risk aversion γ is set to 0.5. I also set the decreasing returns to scale parameter
α to 0.43, which is close to the lower bound of estimates provided in the literature. This
parameter governs the firm’s optimal scale and the dispersion of firm size distribution,
and also the sensitivity of firm capital and output to productivity and bank funding costs.
The probability of exogenous separation is set to 4.4% per quarter to match its empirical
counterpart.35
I also use the data to determine the parameters behind the two processes governing bank
funding. To this end, I use information contained in banks’ quarterly Consolidated Reports
of Condition and Income and define the process of real funding costs in the model as the
ratio of total operating expenses over total assets for the period 1984 through 2014, adjusted
35See appendix for details about the construction of lending relationship flows based on DealScan data.
This estimate is consistent with an average duration of lending relationship of about six years, which is in
line with results in Ongena and Smith (2001). Note also that this is more likely to be a lower bound for the
separation rate of small and medium-sized businesses, given that the DealScan database covers relatively
large firms.
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with the GDP deflator.36 The cross-sectional average of the quarterly funding costs is given
by r¯0 = 1.15%. I also estimate the autocorrelation and standard deviation of this process to
be ρr = 0.94 and σr = 0.25% at the quarterly frequency. Finally, I extract the bank-specific
component of the funding cost by subtracting the cross-sectional average evaluated within
each quarter and computing the autocorrelation and standard deviation for each individual
bank time series available throughout the sample period. The tabulated cross-sectional
averages obtained form this exercise are ρs = 0.84 and σs = 0.1%.
The remaining ten parameters, namely origination costs c, share of divertible capital η,
probability of fresh start ξ, fixed cost kf , garage production d0, matching elasticity γm,
productivity process parameters (z¯, ρz, σz), and upper bound of the distribution of idiosyn-
cratic shocks at entry σs,entry, are calibrated using a particle swarm optimization algorithm
minimizing the relative squared distances between empirical and simulated moments.
I target (i) a yearly real net return-on-assets of 1.2% for Commercial and Industrial loans,
consistent with Boualam (2014). This moment is matched to the cross-sectional average
net return per unit of capital lent, which takes into account the interest rate charged to
borrowers minus bank operating costs (interest and non-interest costs). This moment helps
identify origination cost c because it captures the expected bank profits realized throughout
a relationship.
I target (ii) a yearly cross-sectional average investment rate of 14.5% (Gomes (2001)),
calibrated to match the corresponding moments associated with credit growth rate given
by ∆KK , and (iii) a fraction of constrained firms of 40% as in Cooley et al. (2004). These
targets are particularly helpful in determining η and ξ, the parameters associated with
the borrower’s outside option. In particular, η governs the speed at which firms reach the
unconstrained region (as η tends to 0, the outside option becomes independent of K and
firms reach the first-best level almost immediately). On the other hand, because ξ is linked
36I use here total operating costs, which include both interest and non-interest expenses rather than interest
expenses alone, to better account for heterogeneity in marginal costs incurred by banks. For simplicity and
to stay close to the exposition of the model, I will keep referring to these costs as funding costs.
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to the firm value when unfunded, it relates the volatility of credit growth rate to that of
the aggregate shocks in the economy.
I define (iv) the credit origination rate as the volume of newly issued credit (to both new
and incumbent borrowers) divided by total stock of credit in the economy, and target a
quarterly rate of 6.8%, as obtained for Commercial and Industrial loans over the period
2000-2014.37 This moment is helpful in determining the average level of the productivity
process z¯.
I target a (v) market-to-book value of 2.1, consistent with the estimate for bank-dependent
firms reported in Chava and Purnanandam (2011), and map it to its model counterpart at
the firm level defined as V+BK , and where the net present value of the contract to the bank
B is interpreted as total debt of the firm. This measure captures the degree of distortion
in the contract (and, hence, reflects the allocation of surplus across borrowers and lenders)
and will be helpful in identifying garage production d0.
The fixed cost kf also impacts the joint match surplus and, hence, the search behavior
of agents in the economy. I seek to pin down this parameter by setting (vi) the average
quarterly approval rate p(θ) to 28%, which corresponds to an annual application success
rate of about 75% and an expected credit search period of about three quarters.38
I also identify the matching elasticity parameter γm by targeting (vii) a slope coefficient of
37Given an annual credit growth rate of 14.5% and a creation rate of relationships set at 17.6% in the
steady state, this moment is a 1-1 map with the relative loan size offered to new borrowers through the
following identity:
credit origination rate =
new relationships× K¯ + incumbent relationships×∆K
incumbent relationships×K
= 0.176× K¯
K
+ 0.145 = 0.272,
with K¯ the average loan size at origination.
38Eurostat provides data for the U.K. showing an annual success rates for firms seeking credit in 2007
and 2010 at 88% and 65%, respectively. See epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/european_
business/special_sbs_topics/access_to_finance. Similarly, the 2014 Small Business Credit Survey
(SBCS) shows that 44% (56%) of firms received all or most (at least some) of their financing needs during
the first half of 2014.
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14% for the relationship between approval and interest rates in the cross-section of banks.39
The parameter σs,entry governing the support of the distribution of bank-specific shocks at
entry is calibrated to match (viii) an average dispersion in bank operating costs of 1.77%.
I finally use the autocorrelation and standard deviation of log-detrended output in order to
determine the parameters associated with the aggregate productivity process. In particular,
I use real quarterly log-GDP data (seasonally adjusted, and detrended using the HP filter
with parameter 1600) obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the period Q1
1947 - Q4 2013, and tabulate the following targets: (ix) autocorrelation of 0.84 and (x)
standard deviation of 0.017.
Table 1 reports all model parameter values. Table 2 reports calibration targets and model
counterparts.
1.6.3. Model properties and validation
The model generates a two-dimensional stationary distribution of bank-firm relationships g,
which depends on bank funding cost and current firm value. In the steady-state, unfunded
firms account for 14% of the population, while the fraction of unconstrained firms is 45%.
The remaining 41% are firms matched to banks, but with constrained levels of credit.
The model calibration also leads to an average credit growth rate of about 13% per year,
which is consistent with borrowers being able to reach unconstrained levels of financing after
five to six years. Similarly, interest rates charged to borrowers decrease by an average of 25
basis points per relationship year. This is in line with results in Hubbard et al. (2002) that
suggest a decline of three to nine basis points per lending relationship year after controlling
for size effects.40
39In the cross-section, this means that a 10% increase in approval rates is accompanied by a 1.4% increase
in interest rates charged to borrowers.
40Note that size and lending relationship effects are tightly linked in the model, suggesting that the
relationship-year effect is biased upward.
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Credit application rates, approval rates, and contractual terms in the cross-
section
To test the validity of the calibrated model, I start by exploring the cross-sectional prop-
erties of credit markets, and in particular the relationships among credit application rates,
approval rates, and interest rates offered to borrowers. As described in the theoretical sec-
tion, the directed search setup predicts (i) a negative relationship between application and
approval rates (Figure 8a) and, similarly, (ii) a negative relationship between approval rates
and interest rates charged to borrowers (Figure 8b).
The empirical counterpart of these moments is tabulated based on information contained in
the 2014 joint Small Business Credit Survey (SBCS) report.41 In particular, I use data on
application and approval rates across different types of financial intermediaries to construct
model-equivalent moments.42 Because of the data classification and focus of the paper,
I consider only information available for large (classified as “large” and “regional” in the
SBCS) and small (classified as “small regional or community”) banks. I then solve the
model, considering two idiosyncratic bank shocks, and finally map low-funding and high-
funding types to large and small banks, respectively.43
In the same vein, Figure 8b displays both empirical and model-generated moments for
interest rates across different types of banks. In particular, I construct the corresponding
interest rate spreads using the effective weighted-average interest rates with minimal risk
41This survey is jointly conducted by the Federal Reserve Banks of New York, Atlanta, Cleveland, and
Philadelphia, with the purpose of measuring and reporting information about the functioning of the small
business credit market.
42The appendix provides further details about data and assumptions related to firm credit search used to
construct model-equivalent moments.
43Note that with the assumption that borrowers can apply only once per period, the application rate,
defined as the fraction of unfunded borrowers ui applying to a given bank i, is given by:
application ratei =
ui∑
i ui
=
1
θi∑
i
1
θi
.
We can then solve a simple system of two equations and two unknowns to determine the equivalent theoretical
approval rates and infer the matching elasticity γm.
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adjusted by the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, for the period Q2 1997 - Q1 2014.44
Since contractual terms are not adjusted as frequently in practice, I map the empirical
interest rates to the model-generated average interest rate spreads (interest rate charged
minus risk-free rate) incurred throughout a 10-year lending relationship for each type of
lender.45 The relationships between approval and application rates, and between approval
and interest rates, are both satisfied overall by the model-generated moments for both level
and slope.
Figure 8: Credit application, approval, and interest rates in the cross-section
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(a) Approval vs. application rates
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(b) Approval vs. interest rates
Credit relationship flows
I tabulate measures of creation and destruction rates of lending relationships from LPC’s
DealScan database over the period Q1 1995 - Q1 2013.46 DealScan’s coverage is biased
44These time series are obtained from FRED (EEANXSLNQ, EEANXSSNQ). I report here the corre-
sponding interest rates across a larger sample period, so as to compare the model-generated moments to the
data. Details about data construction are available in the appendix.
45Note that the mapping between the data and model moments is not straightforward here and is subject
to caveats. In particular, the data are at the aggregate level and, hence, do not contain information about
characteristics of bank-firm pairs. Similarly, the model interest rate spreads are sensitive to the length of
relationships considered.
46Although the period covered by the database starts considerably earlier, my sample begins in 1995.
Imposing this date ensures that the database is already well populated, thus limiting the mechanical bias
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toward relatively large firms and may not be representative of the whole economy. Yet, this
is, to my knowledge, the only comprehensive and publicly available source of information
that can be used to construct proxies for these flows. While it is unclear whether positive
flows are higher or lower when considering all firms in the economy, it is reasonable to
assume that destruction rates are a priori understated, since smaller firms are potentially
more likely to default or to not have their loans rolled over, given their relatively high
propensity to violate loan covenants.
Figure 9 displays the quarterly gross rates of creation and destruction of credit relationships
against the net growth rate (i.e., creation minus destruction rate). The model generates a
one-to-one map between positive and net flows by construction, since the model assumes a
constant destruction rate σ. This assumption seems reasonable as a first pass.47
Figure 9: Positive and negative flows of lending relationships
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
-4% -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Per
cen
t of
 tot
al c
red
it re
lati
ons
hip
s
Net growth in percent
Positive relationship flows - Data
Negative relationship flows - Data
Notes. Positive and negative flows of lending relationships as a function of net flows (theoretical
moments are shown in dashed lines).
in positive flows induced by an increase in data coverage. See empirical appendix for details about data
construction.
47Introducing endogenous separation in the contracting problem would be a natural extension to improve
the model fit for destruction rates during downturns, and is left for future research.
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More important, Table 4 in the appendix shows that positive flows are more volatile and
more sensitive to the business cycle relative to negative flows. This suggests that the
adjustment of the stock of lending relationships weighs more heavily on the process of
origination and entry rather than on destruction. In particular, the relative rigidity in
destruction rates may reflect the fact that loan agreements are typically fixed-term and
banks may not always have the flexibility to cut lending until contract maturity.
Funding cost and interest rate dispersion
The dispersions in funding costs and interest rates charged to borrowers mirror the degree
of credit frictions in the economy. Indeed, a perfectly competitive environment with no
friction should lead to the existence of a unique bank supplying credit to all borrowers
at a fixed and unique interest rate. This framework generates dispersion in interest rates
through two channels related to agency and search frictions.
First, the introduction of agency frictions generates interest rate dispersion among firms
within the same bank, depending on the maturity of lending relationships. Second, the
introduction of search also leads to a non-trivial distribution of contractual terms at the
origination stage. The tensions created through these frictions and their evolution over the
business cycle are thus reflected through the dynamics of interest rate dispersion.
The construction of measures of dispersion for bank operating costs (ratio of the sum of
interest and non-interest expenses over total assets) and net interest rates on loans (interest
income minus net charge-offs over total C&I loans) is described in the appendix.48 These
measures are then mapped to their model counterparts.49
Data in Table 3 exhibit an increase in the dispersion of interest rates charged during reces-
sions, while the dispersion in operating costs does not appear to comove with the business
cycle. Since I have calibrated the model to fit the dispersion in bank funding costs in the
48Figure 21 exhibits the corresponding time series.
49Note that these proxies do not account for several heterogeneity dimensions absent in the model. For
example, they abstract from differences in banks’ business models or the collateral coverage ratio of loans.
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steady state, I can now examine the amount of dispersion in interest rates explained by
the model. The model-generated dispersion in interest rates accounts for about 50% of
its empirical counterpart. While positively correlated, this moment is also relatively more
sensitive to the business cycle when compared to the data.
1.7. Effects of aggregate shocks
In this section, I study the effects of aggregate shocks related to bank funding and firm
productivity. I examine the response of the economy along both extensive and intensive
margins, and analyze how these shocks affect credit origination and contractual terms for
both incumbent and new borrowers.
1.7.1. Bank funding shocks
I first examine the implications of a 1% upward shift in aggregate bank funding cost (the
level of funding reverts back to the steady state with persistence ρr¯). Both intensive and
extensive margins of credit are at play. Along the intensive margin, funded firms (both
constrained and unconstrained) scale down their production as the optimal level of capital
decreases. In this case, both firm size and credit availability adjust immediately, since there
are no adjustment costs or capital accumulation. Such effect is short-lived and is mapped
one-to-one with the dynamics of the funding cost.
More important, the propagation mechanism in the model operates through the extensive
margin. Indeed, a bad shock to banks severely impacts access to financing and contractual
terms for unfunded firms. As the joint surplus declines, it becomes less profitable for banks
to establish new lending relationships. Moreover, only banks with sufficiently low funding
costs are able to extend loan offers. Thus, credit market tightness plummets and approval
rates decline, due to the joint effect of a drop in the number of offers and a rise in the mass
of unfunded firms. This is consistent with empirical evidence in Khwaja and Mian (2008),
Jime´nez and Ongena (2012), or Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette (2012) who show that the
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Figure 10: Impulse response: bank funding cost - aggregate variables
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Notes. Impulse response: 1% upward shift in bank funding cost.
probability of extending loans to new borrowers declines after negative bank shocks.
The extensive margin effect therefore generates an overall decline in the number of relation-
ships in the economy whenever the creation rate falls below the fixed rate of destruction.
This effect remains at play until the funding cost reverts back to a sufficiently low level, al-
lowing for a positive net creation of lending relationships, and therefore generates sustained
periods of low credit and output, as shown in Figure 10. Thus, the more persistent the
aggregate shock, the more amplified the decline in the stock of relationships and the more
sluggish the recovery.
In contrast to other macroeconomic models, it is worth highlighting that the aggregate
credit response is endogenously determined and depends on the distribution of lending
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relationships in place. Thus, the economy’s resilience to bad shocks is dependent on the
number and strength of bank-firm connections, rather than being driven by exogenous
fluctuations in firm collateral value.
This theoretical insight highlighting the critical role of lending relationships and their ag-
gregate implications in downturns is shared with Den Haan et al. (2003), and finds its
empirical grounds in seminal work by Bernanke (1983) and more recent studies such as
Chodorow-Reich (2014), Vickery (2005), Kandrac (2014), and Hansen and Ziebarth (2016).
Moreover, by endogenizing firm financing uncertainty through a search-theoretic approach,
this setup can be viewed as an alternative to models introducing additional forms of credit
shocks, as shown in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) or Khan and Thomas (2013).
Let us now focus on the response of the contractual terms, namely credit availability and
pricing. The model generates an interesting stark asymmetric transmission of shocks in
the cross-section. Indeed, strong long-term relationships partially insure borrowers against
negative shocks. For example, banks shield their incumbent borrowers by marginally in-
creasing their interest rates by about 90 basis points during the crisis. Contractual terms
for new borrowers respond more significantly and interest rates charged soar by over 3%.
Conversely, incumbent and new borrowers face similar relative declines in the amount of
credit supplied to them.50
The asymmetry in the treatment between these two types of borrowers is due in part to
the implicit insurance mechanism provided by long-term contracts, and the decline in bank
competition during downturns. On the one hand, banks end up subsidizing their long-term
borrowers during recessions (at the expense of their own profitability) in order to smooth
out borrowers’ dividends whenever the match surplus is low. Interestingly, the decline in
credit competition actually favors incumbent borrowers. Due to the general equilibrium
effect, their outside option declines, which mitigates contract distortions and helps dampen
50Note that the garage production parameter d0 is constant and thus partly mitigates the sensitivity of
the unfunded firm value to aggregate shocks.
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Figure 11: Impulse response: bank funding cost - contractual terms
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Notes. Impulse response: 1% upward shift in bank funding cost. The Lerner index is defined
here as the ratio of banks’ net return on assets (i.e., the difference between interest rates and
total bank costs) over interest rates.
the drop in credit availability.51
On the other hand, as the bad shock hits the economy, credit market tightness declines and
so does bank competition. Thus, the shift of the relative bargaining power toward banks
extending credit offers means that they get to extract a larger share of the surplus, further
impacting new borrowers. Therefore, the contractual terms offered to unfunded firms are
adjusted unfavourably during recessions and reflect a sharp decline in credit availability in
addition to higher interest rates. This result relates directly to the empirical literature on
the bank lending channel and is particularly consistent with findings in Santos and Winton
(2013). That work shows that the degree of bank bargaining power can be a critical factor
51The dampening effect of relationship banking is also present in Bolton et al. (2016) through a different
channel.
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governing loan terms following a deterioration of borrowers’ cash flows, and suggests that
part of credit tightening and interest rate increases may relate to a drop in bank competition
during downturns.
1.7.2. Productivity shocks
Let us now consider the response of the economy following a one-standard-deviation de-
crease in aggregate productivity (aggregate productivity returns to its steady-state level
with persistence ρz).
52 This shock generates the same qualitative responses as a positive
bank funding shock. Overall, however, responses are relatively less sensitive.53 Two main
reasons explain this difference. First, productivity and bank funding costs enter into the
surplus function differently. Second and more important, aggregate productivity is less
volatile relative to bank funding costs in this calibration.
1.8. Policy experiments
This section explores potential policies aimed at reviving bank lending. The model is
particularly helpful at comparing blanket policies that impact all banks and firms with
policies that are targeted toward the creation of new lending relationships, such as subsidies
to origination costs. I analyze here how such policies can lead to different outcomes in the
context of the model.
1.8.1. A simple policy targeting the extensive margin of credit
I analyze the effects of a policy targeted specifically toward increasing credit origination.
The goal of this policy is broadly similar to that of the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF)
proposed in the U.S. as part of the 2010 Small Business Jobs Act. It is also related to the
Funding for Lending Scheme implemented in the U.K. and the European Central Bank’s
52Figure 17 in the appendix displays this response.
53The response of aggregate output is again overstated given that the model does not account for the
accumulation of capital stock.
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Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operation (T-LTRO) program.54 While the SBLF only
targets relatively small banks, the other programs are broader in scope and subsidize bank
funding whenever certain lending criteria are met.
I run a simple policy experiment in which the government subsidizes part of the origination
costs c.55 This closely resembles the policies mentioned above, in the sense that it is a
subsidy contingent on the origination of new credit, but with one main difference being
that this is a one-time lump-sum subsidy transferred at origination.
Figures 12 and 13 display the economy’s transitional path following an unanticipated imple-
mentation of the policy at date 1 (here subsidizing 20% of the origination costs). Although
the aim here is not to analyze welfare implications, this experiment can already help us
gauge the policy’s short- and long-run effects on credit allocation and contractual terms
across new and incumbent borrowers.
Figure 12: Response to credit origination subsidies - aggregate variables
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54See www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/FLS/default.aspx for more details.
55Note that this parameter not only reflects screening costs and non-interest expenses incurred by banks
during origination, but can be more generally interpreted as the initial sunk investment or long-term debt of
the entrepreneur. Lowering c can therefore also be viewed as a subsidy to entrepreneurs, as in, for example,
the case of the Small Business Administration (SBA) loan guarantee program.
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While it naturally delivers an increase in the number of lending relationships and credit
supplied in the economy in the long run, the policy may actually appear initially counter-
productive. More important, by directly affecting credit market conditions, the policy has
important redistributional consequences in the short run, as it has a different impact across
borrowers.
On the one hand, it is beneficial to unfunded firms because it improves their access to
banks and overall credit availability. On the other hand, it may negatively impact cur-
rently funded but constrained borrowers. As origination costs decrease, bank entry and
competition increase as well, which improves liquidity in credit markets. This, however,
also increases incumbent borrowers’ outside options and leads banks to adjust their credit
supply downward to prevent any default. As incumbent borrowers gradually grow out of
their borrowing constraints, this adverse effect dissipates, allowing for the aggregate credit
supply to eventually increase.56
Figure 13: Response to credit origination subsidies - contractual terms
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56Although not accounted for in the model, this origination policy may decrease the lenders’ incentives to
screen borrowers. Decreased screening would result in more firm defaults and loan charge-offs. The policy
may therefore need to be accompanied by further monitoring by regulators to restore such incentives.
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1.8.2. Joint policy intervention
How can we mitigate these adverse short-term effects? One potential solution is to combine
this origination subsidy policy (“c policy”) with a decline in bank funding costs (“rd policy”),
keeping total intervention cost constant.57 This “joint policy” can appear to be the most
cost-effective way to spur credit along both intensive and extensive margins, with the benefit
of muting any adverse feedback effects in the short term.
The overall benefits clearly depend on aggregate credit market variables, such as the mass
of unfunded firms and banks offering credit, and the institutional parameters affecting the
strength of the feedback effect.58
Figure 14: Policy comparison - aggregate variables
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57While a simple decline in bank funding costs would also generate an immediate increase in aggregate
credit, its effects on lending relationships are relatively moderate. This policy also comes at a very high
cost, since it is non-targeted and also benefits incumbent borrowers. Moreover, because the model features
a lag in the transmission of monetary policy from the financial sector to the real economy, this also leads to
a substantial rise in bank profits in the short term.
58A potential alternative to breaking the general equilibrium feedback effect would be to limit en-
trepreneurs’ ability to get a fresh start after default (i.e., decrease parameter ξ). Thus, stronger creditor
rights and more strict bankruptcy laws may also have a positive effect on aggregate credit supply.
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1.9. Extensions and comments
The framework analyzed in this paper can be extended along many directions, which are
left for future research. In this section, I describe three possible extensions and explain
their general implications.
1.9.1. Endogenous separation
I consider the possibility of endogenous separation between borrowers and lenders. In
this case, the bank also takes into account the firm’s discrete decision rule with regard to
separation. Following the realization of aggregate and bank-specific shocks, the firm’s choice
is therefore driven by max{Vz,rd ,W (z)}, which balances the current value of the contract
Vz,rd if the relationship continues and the firm’s value following separation W (z).
Because the contract specifies state-contingent continuation values {Vz′,r′d}z′,r′d before shocks
are realized, this simply translates into a probability of termination in each future state,
given by:
σz′,r′d = σ(z
′, r′d, Vz′,r′d) =
 σ if Vz′,r′d ≥W (z
′),
1 otherwise.
with σ being an exogenous destruction rate. In equilibrium, the bank can never promise
a value that is below the unfunded firm value W . Otherwise, the firm will always walk
away in order to search for a better lending opportunity. However, in certain states where
there are no gains from trade, both agents may be better off with separation. In this case
the bank receives 0 (the bank derives no income stream when unmatched), and the firm
becomes unfunded with value W .
Since the bank is fully committed to deliver promised value V , the promised values offered
in the continuation states are higher relative to the case where separation is not allowed.
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In this case, the saddle-point problem is slightly modified as follows:
P (z, rd,Λ) = infλ supK,d zf(K)− d− rdK − λ [u(ηK) + βH(z)]
+(Λ + λ)
[
u(d) + βσEz[W (z′)]
]
+β(1− σ)Ez,rd
[
max((Λ + λ)W (z′), P (z′, r′d,Λ + λ))
]
subject to
d ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0.
Introducing endogenous separation allows credit market conditions to affect the contract
dynamics through a third channel. In this case, aggregate shocks may be further amplified,
since they affect both the creation and destruction of lending relationships and hence may
generate even larger credit declines and more sluggish recoveries.
1.9.2. Capital accumulation
The model is tractable enough to allow for the introduction of capital accumulation or
entrepreneurial savings. In this case, the firm capital stock becomes an additional state
variable affecting contract dynamics and the distribution of firms in the economy. From
a qualitative standpoint, this will not impact the shape of the contracts as long as firms’
capital is perfectly observable by the lender. However, the ability to accumulate capital
also means that entrepreneurs are in general better off — relative to the baseline model
— whenever they become unfunded. Thus, the level of accumulated capital creates an
additional layer of heterogeneity in credit markets and has additional aggregate implications
due to its effect on the search behavior of unfunded firms.
1.9.3. Credit markets for startups vs. established firms
In a similar vein, the model can also be augmented by allowing for market segmentation
among unfunded borrowers and distinguishing between newly created firms (“startups”),
and “established” firms (i.e., previously funded firms currently searching for new financiers).
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One dimension in which these two markets may differ is related to search and origination
costs. Indeed, startups may be viewed as more opaque with a more costly and screening-
intensive credit origination process as opposed to more established firms with publicly ob-
servable track records. Such difference in search costs creates environments with distinct
credit market conditions and can, for example, help justify differences observed in the level
of interest rate dispersion between small and large firms (Cerqueiro et al. (2011)). This
feature is also easy to implement and would generate additional predictions for contractual
terms and the dynamics of credit allocation across firm types.
1.10. Conclusion
This paper develops and characterizes a novel dynamic equilibrium theory of bank relation-
ship capital in an economy subject to search frictions and limited enforceability. The model
features a dynamic contracting problem within a directed search equilibrium, with aggregate
and bank-specific uncertainty, and where heterogeneous financiers compete for borrowers
by posting long-term credit offers. The interaction between these two frictions generates
a slow accumulation of lending relationship capital and distorts the optimal allocation of
credit along both intensive and extensive margins.
This research sheds light on the process of credit relationship formation and its macroeco-
nomic consequences. Significantly, it highlights a new propagation mechanism stemming
from the destruction of credit relationships and their slow build-up after an adverse aggre-
gate shock. Crises characterized by a sizable destruction of this relationship capital can
therefore generate slow subsequent recoveries.
The model provides a framework that captures multiple dimensions of the credit reallocation
process and is particularly relevant when analyzing the effects of policies targeted toward
reviving business lending after a crisis. In particular, the paper shows that policies directly
subsidizing the cost of originating new credit relationships are effective at boosting the
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aggregate credit supply in the long run but can also lead to adverse effects in the short run.
Further empirical analysis focusing on the dynamics of the extensive margin of credit and
the process of loan origination and matching between banks and firms is a fruitful area for
future work. More generally, this paper is a first investigation of the notion of relationship
capital with an application to credit markets. The theory and methodology developed
here can be further extended to examining other contexts in which relationships matter,
e.g., those between firms and managers or between suppliers and customers in production
networks. These potential applications are left for future research.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Tables
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
calibrated
β 0.9875 Discount factor
γ 0.5 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
α 0.43 Decreasing returns to scale parameter
σ 0.044 Exogenous separation probability
r¯0 0.0115 Average funding cost
ρr 0.94 Persistence of aggregate funding shock
σr 0.0025 Standard deviation of aggregate funding shock
ρs 0.84 Persistence of idiosyncratic funding shock
σs 0.001 Standard deviation of idiosyncratic funding shock
estimated
ξ 0.29 Probability of fresh start
η 0.37 Share of divertible assets
c 7.03 Origination cost
γm 2.28 Matching elasticity
d0 0.127 Garage production
kf 0.19 Fixed cost
z¯ 0.311 Average aggregate productivity
σz 0.0135 Standard deviation of aggregate productivity shock
ρz 0.85 Persistence of aggregate productivity shock
σs,entry 0.006 Upper bound of the idiosyncratic funding shock at entry
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Table 2: Targeted moments
Data Model
Return on Assets 0.012 0.012
Credit growth rate ∆K/K 0.145 0.136
Fraction of constrained firms 0.40 0.41
Credit origination rate 0.068 0.054
Market-to-Book ratio 2.1 2.0
Approval rate p(θ) 0.28 0.27
Slope (p(θ), interest rate) 0.14 0.17
Dispersion in funding costs 0.018 0.017
ρ(log(output)) 0.84 0.76
σ(log(output)) 0.017 0.016
Notes. This table reports empirical and simulated moments.
Log(output) is detrended using HP filter parameter 1600, and au-
tocorrelations and standard deviations are computed based on log-
deviations from trend.
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Table 3: Dispersion statistics - funding costs and loan interest rates
Data Model
average cor(X,GDP) average cor(X,GDP)
Dispersion in funding costs 1.77 0.07 1.65 0
Dispersion in loan rates 3.82 0.34 1.92 0.73
Notes. Sample period: 1984 - 2014. Quarterly correlations with GDP are tabulated between
cyclical components of HP-filtered logged time series; HP filter parameter: 1600.
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A.2. Figures
Figure 15: Comparative statics - ξ
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Figure 16: Comparative statics - c
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Figure 17: Impulse response - aggregate productivity
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(b) Contractual terms
64
A.3. Data construction
This section provides details about data sources and the construction of time series used in
the quantitative analysis section of the paper.
A.3.1. Bank lending relationships
I document in this section the methodology behind the construction of time series for the
rates of creation and destruction of credit relationships. To that end, I use the Loan Pricing
Corporation DealScan database (LPC) and focus on U.S. loan syndications denominated in
U.S. Dollars. I construct time series for positive, negative, and net relationship flows based
on a sample covering the period from January 1986 through March 2016.
In order to measure these flows, I need to determine the date of inception and termination
of each bank-firm pair forming a lending relationship. First, since LPC comprises mainly
syndicated loans with potentially many bank participants, I consider only the lead arranger
and/or main agent for each loan package. When a given loan package involves more than
one lead arranger, I consider the ensuing lending relationship for each lender separately.
For a given bank-firm pair, I define m¯t as the maximum maturity date recorded across all
loan agreements made up to date t. For any given date t, a bank-firm pair is considered
inactive if it has never been matched up to this date, or if it has been matched in the past
but no new transaction took place in the three years following the maximum maturity date
of all previous deals, i.e., m¯t < t− 3Y . In the former case, the bank-firm pair is considered
inactive starting from date m¯t. Otherwise, it is considered active between the corresponding
dates of inception and termination. The date of inception is defined as the date in which
an inactive bank-firm pair is formed, while the date of termination is given by the date in
which an existing and active bank-firm pair becomes inactive.1
In the benchmark case, I do not control for bank mergers. That said, I also consider a
1Exploring the determinants behind the destruction of a match is important to fully uncover the economics
of bank-firm relationships. This is left for future research.
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more general definition aggregating all lenders matched to a given firm. This allows me
to control for potential bank switching or bank mergers (it therefore mitigates potential
churning effects). The results remain qualitatively similar in this case.
I track the dates of inception and termination of each lending relationship and construct
the aggregate portfolio of lending relationships for all active banks.2
Finally, I construct time series for the stock of lending relationships based on the cumulated
net flows calculated over the period 1986 through 1995. I then use the stock value beginning
in January 1995, as my reference point to define creation and destruction rates. This is
a reasonable assumption, since the average duration of a lending relationship is about six
years. The time series for creation and destruction rates are considered for the period Q1
1995 through Q1 2013. I chose to start in 1995 to ensure that the database is already well-
populated and hence avoid spurious changes in entry rates due to improved firm coverage in
LPC. Similarly, the data series stops in 2013 given that the tabulation of destruction rates
is forward-looking.
Figure 18 plots the time series associated with positive (creation), negative (destruction),
and net lending relationship flows. Figures 19 and 20 show the evolution of the stock of
lending relationships and C&I loans and their cyclical properties.
Table 4: Properties of lending relationship flows
Net flows Positive flows Negative flows
mean (%) 1.05 5.52 4.47
std(%) 1.37 1.34 0.79
corr(x,GDP) 0.40 0.30 -0.18
Notes. Sample period: Q1 1995 - Q1 2013. Data are at the
quarterly frequency. GDP refers to the cyclical component of
detrended log GDP; HP filter parameter: 1600.
2Note that bank name entries are not recorded uniformly. Thus, I manually consolidate bank names
reported in the database to prevent other spurious creations or destructions of lending relationships. Addi-
tional details and robustness checks related to (i) multiple lending relationships, (ii) inactivity periods, and
(iii) flow decomposition by firm size are also available upon request.
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A.3.2. Measures of application and approval rates
I report below aggregated information provided in the 2014 Small Business Credit Survey.
The SCBS classifies credit sources into four categories: Large banks, Regional banks, Small
regional or community banks, and Online lenders. Table 5 shows the results for all polled
firms as reported on page 15 of the survey.
Table 5: Credit application and approval rates
Application rate Approval rate
Large bank 35% 31%
Regional bank 41% 45%
Small regional or community bank 34% 59%
Online lenders 18% 38%
Notes. Source: Small Business Credit Survey 2014.
Next, I describe the methodology used to tabulate empirical moments associated with the
model-generated credit application and approval rates. To map the above information to
the model moments, I need to make the following set of assumptions:
• Online lenders are excluded, with the assumption that their business model differs
significantly from that of a traditional bank.
• Large and Regional banks are combined into one category: “Large and regional”.
• Application rates are normalized to sum up to 1 to be consistent with the model’s
assumption of one application per bank type and per period. Such an assumption is
also used to convert semiannual approval rates provided by the SBCS in Table 6 into
quarterly frequency.
Adjusted application and approval rates at the quarterly frequency are shown in Table 7.3
3An alternative source of information comes from the loan broker Biz2credit.com, which reports approval
rates of small and large banks on a monthly basis. Assuming one application per quarter, the quarterly
approval rates reported for June 2014 are 18% and 52% for large and small banks, respectively.
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Table 6: Credit application outcomes
Received all Received most Received some Received none
Credit application outcome 33% 9% 12% 44%
Notes. Credit applicants’ response to the question: “How much of the financing your business applied for in
the first half of 2014 was approved?” “Received most” refers to receiving more than 50%; “Received some”
refers to receiving less than 50% of the financing need. Source: Small Business Credit Survey 2014.
Table 7: Model-equivalent credit application and approval rates
Application rate (adjusted) Approval rate (adjusted)
Large & regional bank 69% 21%
Small regional or community bank 31% 36%
Notes. Source: Small Business Credit Survey 2014.
A.3.3. Other time series
Bank marginal operating costs. I define bank marginal operating costs as the sum of
interest and non-interest expenses over total assets as follows:
Marginal operating costs =
Interest expenses + Non-interest expenses
Total assets
=
RIAD4073 + RIAD4093
RCFD2170
Data are obtained from the Reports of Condition and Income for commercial banks, from
1984 through 2014. These operating costs are then converted into real terms using the GDP
deflator.
Net loan returns. I construct the net real returns for C&I loans to proxy for the interest
rate offered to risk-free commercial borrowers. In order to control for heterogeneity in the
quality and riskiness of borrowers, I define this return as the real yield on C&I loans adjusted
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for both charge-offs and recoveries, as follows:
Net loan returns =
Interest income− Charge-offs + Recoveries
Total C&I loans
=
RIAD4012− RIAD4638 + RIAD4608
RCFD1766
Data are obtained from the Reports of Condition and Income for commercial banks, from
1984 through 2014. Similarly, net loan returns are converted into real terms using the GDP
deflator. Item RCFD1766 refers to C&I loans excluding bank acceptances.
Note that the time series and moments associated with marginal operating costs and net
loan returns are constructed as follows:
• I first winsorize all variables mentioned above (except total assets and C&I loans) at
the 1% level in order to mitigate the effect of outliers.
• Cross-sectional averages and dispersion moments are value-weighted.
• To determine the parameters governing the bank-specific costs, I first determine the
autocorrelation and standard deviation of the AR(1) process at the bank-level. The
estimated parameters are then winsorized at the 1% level before computing cross-
sectional averages.
Credit origination rate. It is defined as the ratio of new commercial credit origination,
obtained from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL) over total volume of C&I
loans (FRED:BUSLOANS). Data are available from 2000 through 2014.
Interest rate spreads. Interest rate spreads are computed as the difference between the
effective weighted average interest rates with minimal risk borrowers offered by Large and
Small banks, provided by the STBL (FRED: EEANXSLNQ, EEANXSSNQ), and the 1-year
Treasury constant maturity rate (FRED: DGS1), over the period Q2 1997 - Q1 2014.
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Figure 18: Deconstructing lending relationships flows
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Notes. Sample period: Q1 1995 - Q1 2013. Author’s calculations based on DealScan data.
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Figure 19: C&I loans and lending relationship stock
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Notes. Sample period: Q1 1995 - Q1 2013. Time series are normalized to 100 in Q1 1995. C&I loans are
taken from the Fed Board’s H.8 release of Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks and deflated using
the GDP deflator. The stock of lending relationships is tabulated from DealScan data.
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Figure 20: Cyclical properties of C&I loans and lending relationships
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Notes. Sample period: Q1 1995 - Q1 2013. Cyclical components of HP-filtered logged time series for C&I
loan and lending relationship stocks, HP filter parameter: 1600.
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Figure 21: Dispersion rates for bank funding costs and net C&I loan rates
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Notes. Sample period: Q1 1984 - Q4 2014. Time series tabulated based on the Reports of Condition and
Income for commercial banks.
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A.4. Computational methodology
This section summarizes the numerical procedure used to solve the dynamic contracting
problem and the competitive search equilibrium. Solving the full model is equivalent to
solving a fixed-point problem in the vector of unfunded firm values {W (z)}z.
• Initialize {W (z)}z, with W (z) increasing in aggregate state z.
• Loop over the following steps until entry condition c = B∗(z;W ) is satisfied for all
aggregate states jointly:
1. Given {W (z)}z, solve recursively the contracting problem formulated in the La-
grange multiplier space as described to get P (z, rd,Λ), and determine the corre-
sponding contract value to the bank in the promised utility space B(z, rd, V ).
2. Determine the indifference condition for unfunded firms and compute {ρ(z)}z
based on the following identity:
ρ(z) = p(θ(z, V ))(V − Ez[W (z′)])
=
W (z)− u(d0)− βEz[W (z′)]
β
.
3. For each idiosyncratic state rd, solve for the contract value V optimizing expected
bank profits:
V ∗(z, rd;W ) = arg max
V
q(θ(z, V ))B(z, rd, V ;W ),
and compute
B∗(z;W ) = Erd
[
[q(θ(z, V ∗(z, rd;W )))B(z, rd, V ∗(z, rd;W );W )]+
]
.
4. For each z, update W (z) either upward if c < B∗(z;W ), or downward otherwise.
74
A.5. Theory, derivations, and proofs
A.5.1. Contracting problem
I rewrite below the general formulation of the contracting problem for the bank, and the
derivation of the recursive multiplier formulation for the exogenous separation case.4
B(z, rd, V ) = max
K,d,{V ′}
zf(K)− d− rdK + βEz,rd
[
(1− σ)B(z′, r′d, V ′)
]
subject to
V = u(d) + βEz,rd
[
(1− σ)V ′ + σW (z′)] , (Promise-Keeping)
V O(z,K;W ) ≤ V, (Participation)
d ≥ 0. (Limited Liability)
Notations
V : current firm value
{Vz′,r′d}z′,r′d : state-contingent continuation values
{W (z)}z : firm value when unfunded
{H(z)}z : firm value after default
K : capital
d : dividend payout
z : productivity shock
rd : bank funding shock
η : share of divertible assets
ξ : probability of access to credit markets after default
4Note that the endogenous separation case discussed in section 9 introduces an additional difficulty
because it features a kink in the bank value function.
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Proof. Proposition 1. Lagrangian formulation.
The problem above is not immediately solved using standard dynamic programming tech-
niques because of the forward-looking nature of the participation constraint. The saddle-
point problem methodology developed in Marcet and Marimon (2011) allows for a more
tractable approach and provides a recursive formulation to the problem.
The following derivations show how I adapt this methodology to my problem.
First, let us denote Λ the cumulative Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrower’s
participation constraint and define the Pareto problem P (z, rd,Λ) = supVB(z, rd, V ) + ΛV
as follows:
P (z, rd,Λ) = sup
V,K,d,{Vz′,r′
d
}
zf(K)− d− rdK + βEz,rd [(1− σ)B(z′, r′d, Vz′,r′d)] + ΛV
s.t.
V ≥ u(ηK) + βH(z)
V = u(d) + βEz,rd
[
(1− σ)Vz′,r′d + σW (z
′)
]
.
Replacing V in the equation above yields:
P (z, rd,Λ) = sup
V,K,d,{Vz′,r′
d
}
zf(K)− d− rdK + βEz,rd [(1− σ)B(z′, r′d, Vz′,r′d)]
+Λ
[
u(d) + βEz,rd [σW (z
′) + (1− σ)Vz′,r′d ]
]
s.t.
u(d) + βEz,rd
[
(1− σ)Vz′,r′d + σW (z
′)
]
≥ u(ηK) + βH(z).
We can now include the participation constraint with weight λ and rearrange terms to get
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the saddle-point problem:
P (z, rd,Λ) = inf
λ
sup
K,d
zf(K)− d− rdK + (Λ + λ)
[
u(d) + βσEz[W (z′)]
]
−λ [u(ηK) + βH(z)]
+β(1− σ)
Ez,rd [ supVz′,r′d B(z′, r′d, Vz,rd) + (Λ + λ)Vz′,r′d︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (z′,r′d,Λ+λ)
]
 .
Equivalently, with Λ′ = Λ + λ, we have:
P (z, rd,Λ) = inf
Λ′≥Λ
sup
K,d
zf(K)− d− rdK + Λ′
[
u(d) + βσEz[W (z′)]
]
+(Λ− Λ′) [u(ηK) + βH(z)]
+β(1− σ)Ez,rd [P (z′, r′d,Λ′)].
Eventually, we can easily check that all the standard assumptions and regularity conditions
needed for the application of theorems 1 and 2 in Marcet and Marimon (2011) are verified
in order to justify that a solution to the saddle-point problem is indeed equivalent to that
of the original maximization problem.
Once the saddle-point problem is solved, we can eventually recover the bank profit and firm
values thanks to the definition of the Pareto problem as follows:
V (z, rd,Λ) =
∂P
∂Λ
(z, rd,Λ)
B(z, rd, V ) = P (z, rd,Λ
∗(z, rd, V ))− Λ∗(z, rd, V )V.
Given the cumulative Lagrange multiplier Λ′, the state-contingent continuation values
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{Vz′,r′d}z′,r′d can be obtained from the following first-order condition:
∂B
∂V
(z′, r′d, Vz′,r′d) = −Λ
′.
A.5.2. Properties of the cumulative Lagrange multiplier Λ
Conditional on continuation, the solution to the optimal contract verifies the following first-
order conditions linking the cumulative Lagrange multiplier Λ to the optimal policies for
capital K and dividends d:
z
∂f(K)
∂K
= rd − (Λ− Λ′)ηu′(ηK) (A.1)
1
Λ′
= u′(d). (A.2)
Equation (A.1) determines the optimal level of capital as a function of Lagrange multipliers
(Λ,Λ′). When Λ = Λ′ (or, equivalently, λ = 0), the participation constraint is never binding
and the firm is unconstrained. In such cases, capital is at the first-best level by KFB.
A.5.3. Properties of B
The following lemmas establish a series of properties of B that are useful for the remaining
proofs in this section.
Auxiliary Lemma. B(z, rd, V ) is strictly increasing in z and decreasing in rd.
Proof. This result is straightforward and follows from the fact that the function pi(., ., V )
defined in the intermediate problem 1.6 is strictly increasing in z and decreasing in rd.
.
Auxiliary Lemma. B(., ., V ) is strictly decreasing and concave in V in the continuation
region, with a slope in [− 1
u′(d¯) , 0].
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Proof. This result stems from the observation that an increase in promised value V is
always costly to the lender. The lower bound of the slope follows from equation (1.7). For
example, when u(d) = d
1−γ
1−γ , and for z and rd constant, this lower bound is given by −d¯γ .
As in Lemma 3 in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), the concavity of B(., ., V ) follows
directly from the concavity of function pi(., ., V ) in equation 1.6 in this paper and Theorem
9.8 in Stokey and Lucas (1989).
.
Auxiliary Lemma. Fix z and W . B(rd, V ) = B(z, rd, V ;W ) is submodular in rd and V .
Proof. Let us fix aggregate shock z and unfunded firm value W without loss of generality
and write B(rd, V ) = T (B)(rd, V ), where T is the operator mapping the set of continuous
functions defined over [W,V ]× [r0, rN ] into itself.
Let us first define the surplus function
S(z, rd, V ) =
 zf(Kcons(z, V ))− rdKcons(z, V ), if V < V (z, rd),zf(KFB(z, rd))− rdKFB(z, rd), if V ≥ V (z, rd).
It is straightforward to show that S is continuous and differentiable in both rd and V .
Moreover, it is submodular in V and rd. Indeed, we have:
∂2S
∂rd∂V
=

− ∂Kcons(z, V )
∂V︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
, if V < V (z, rd),
0 , if V ≥ V (z, rd).
Let us now consider a function B to be submodular in (rd, V ), and let us write the cross-
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derivative of T (B) with respect to both rd and V :
∂2T (B)
∂rd∂V
(rd, V ) =
∂S
∂rd∂V
(rd, V ) + β(1− σ)E
[
∂2B
∂rd∂V
(rd, V )
]
≤ 0.
The operator T therefore maps the space of submodular functions into itself and the unique
fixed point is also submodular.
A.5.4. Main proofs
Proof. Corollary 1.
Notice that Kcons(z, V ) satisfies the following expression in the constrained region:
u(ηKcons(z, V )) = V − βH(z). (A.3)
The results follow immediately, given that both utility and production functions are strictly
increasing in K. Note, however, that this result is valid in partial equilibrium, as both ξ
and η can affect (negatively) W in the general equilibrium version of the model.
Proof. Proposition 2. In section 2.
Proof. Proposition 3. In section 2.
Proof. Proposition 4.
Let us first look at the case in which the borrower is risk neutral as in Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn (2004). In this case, both agents are indifferent about the timing of consump-
tion. Thus, it is always efficient to postpone dividend payouts, to allow for faster increase in
firm value until the unconstrained region is reached. Here, the promise-keeping constraint
yields V ′ = Vβ . The firm value is therefore always increasing in the constrained region at
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rate 1β .
Let us now look at the generalization of this result to risk-averse borrowers. In this case,
agents are faced with two counteracting motives, namely consumption smoothing and higher
savings incentives. The incentive for higher savings, however, does not dominate the agent’s
willingness to grow out of the borrowing constraint. Indeed, assume by contradiction that
V ′ ≤ V , then V < u(d)1−β from the promise-keeping constraint. But the firm payout is strictly
increasing whenever the participation constraint is binding. Therefore, firm value V must
be at least greater than u(d)1−β , and V
′ must be strictly greater than V .
Proof. Proposition 5.
To prove this result, I write down the following equality derived from the envelope condition
and the first order condition on V ′:
∂B(z, rd,1, Vz′,rd,1)
∂V
=
∂B(z, rd,0, Vz′,rd,0)
∂V
= −Λ′,
for all states rd,0 ≤ rd,1. I then proceed by using the property of submodularity of B with
respect to rd and V derived in Lemma A.5.3, which gives us the immediate result that if
rd,0 ≤ rd,1, then necessarily Vz′,rd,1 ≤ Vz′,rd,0 .
Fix z and rd. Let us now define B¯(z, rd, V ;W ) = q(θ(z, V ;W ))B(z, rd, V ;W ) over the
compact interval S = [W, S¯], where S¯ is the maximum value obtained by the entrepreneur
when the joint match surplus is kept entirely by the firm.
Proof. Lemma 1. Existence of an interior solution V ∗.
B¯ is continuous in V over S as a product of two continuous functions in V over S. The
problem is therefore well defined and the solution to the maximization problem must also be
in S. But B¯(z, rd,W,W ) = B¯(z, rd, S¯;W ) = 0, because q(θ(z,W ;W )) = B(z, rd, S¯,W ) = 0
and the supremum of B¯ must be strictly positive (for at least some rd) to warrant bank
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entry in the first place; hence, for z,rd, and W given, the solution maximizing B¯
V (V ) =
B¯(z, rd, V,W ) must be in (W, S¯).
Moreover, we can show that V ∗ is unique if B¯(V ) is indeed strictly concave in V over S. To
that end, let us define the function φ(V ) = q ◦ p−1( ρ(z)V−Ez [W (z′)])) = q(θ(z, V )). The function
φ is strictly increasing and strictly concave in V , thanks to the regularity properties of q
and q ◦ p−1 (in particular the assumption that q ◦ p−1 is strictly decreasing and concave).
Moreover, we can differentiate B¯V (V ) twice with respect to V, to get:
B¯V
′′
= φ′′︸︷︷︸
<0
B︸︷︷︸
≥0
+2 φ′︸︷︷︸
>0
B′︸︷︷︸
<0
+ φ︸︷︷︸
≥0
B′′︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0.
B¯ is therefore strictly concave in V and has a unique supremum in (W, S¯).
.
Auxiliary Lemma. B is decreasing in W .
Proof. Since B¯(., ., .,W ) is continuous and decreasing in W , by the envelope theorem, its
maximum over S = [W, S¯] must also be decreasing and continuous over the same interval S.
Therefore B(., ., .,W ) defined in the dynamic program (A.1) is also decreasing in W over S
whenever B(., ., .,W ) > 0.
Proof. Lemma 2.
(i) We know from above that B¯ is continuous and decreasing in W . Moreover, it is strictly
decreasing in W whenever it is positive. If no entrant bank posts a loan offer, then expected
bank profits cannot be positive. Hence, the entry condition implies the existence of at least
one solution. A solution exists for sufficiently small c. B(z, rd,W,W ) is strictly positive,
since f ′(0) = ∞ and pi > 0. When c is sufficiently small, the intermediate value theorem
justifies the existence of a solution given that B(., ., .,W ) > 0 (i.e., there exists a non-
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empty interval for rd such that B¯(z, rd,W,W ) > 0), B(., ., .,W ) is strictly decreasing in W ,
and limW→S¯ B(., ., .,W ) = 0. Moreover, when it exists, the solution is unique given that
B(., ., .,W ) is strictly monotonic in W .
(ii) Straightforward from equations (1.9), (1.13) and (1.14).
Proof. Proposition 6. Credit markets in the cross-section.
Let us first show that B¯(z, rd, V,W ) is submodular in V and rd.
The submodularity of B¯ with respect to V and rd is a direct consequence of the submodu-
larity of B and the convexity of q. Indeed, we have:
∂2B¯
∂V ∂rd
=
∂q(V )
∂V︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
∂V
∂B∂rd︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+ q(V )︸︷︷︸
≥0
∂2T (B)
∂V ∂rd︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ 0.
(i) Let us first show that V ∗ is decreasing in rd. Let us fix z and W without loss of
generality. To simplify notations, let us also denote B(rd, V ) = B(z, rd, V,W ) and define
V ∗0 = arg maxV B¯(rd,0, V ). From the submodularity property of B¯, we have:
0 =
∂q
∂V
B(rd,0, V0) + q(V0)
∂B
∂V
(rd,0, V0)
≥ ∂q
∂V
B(rd,1, V0) + q(V0)
∂B
∂V
(rd,1, V0).
Eventually, since B¯ is strictly concave in V , then if V ∗1 = arg maxV B¯(rd,1, V ) exists such
that ∂q∂V B(rd,1, V1) + q(V1)
∂B
∂V (rd,1, V1) = 0, it must be that V
∗
1 < V
∗
0 .
Eventually, the properties of capital level at originationK0(rd) and approval rate p(θ(V
∗(rd)))
follow immediately from the properties of capital policy (Proposition 2) and matching prob-
ability p.
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Proof. Proposition 7. Existence of a directed search equilibrium.
I prove the existence of an equilibrium using Schauder’s fixed point Theorem as stated in
Stokey and Lucas (1989) – Theorem 17.4 and following the general exposition in Menzio
and Shi (2010) and Schaal (2015).
Let us first define the set of functions P : Z × Rs × S → R such that ∀ B ∈ P, B is: (i)
bounded, (ii) decreasing and concave in V , (iii) continuous and bi-Lipschitz in V . In order to
apply Schauder’s theorem, I proceed by showing the following properties: (a) equilibrium
objects W , θ, p, and q are well defined and continuous; the operator T defined by the
dynamic program (1.3) (b-0) maps P into itself; (b-1) is continuous over P; and (c) the
family of functions T (B) is equicontinuous.
(a) Existence, uniqueness, and boundedness of WB(z), given B ∈ P.
First, for a given B ∈ P, Lemma 2 gives us the existence and uniqueness of WB (assuming
c is sufficiently small). The boundedness is immediate since W must lie in the compact set
S0 = [S, S¯].
Let us define A = (W, S¯1−β ]. The complementary slackness condition (equation 1.14) tells
us that either θ(z, V ) = 0 or ∃ a > 0, such that q(θ(z, V ))B(z, rd, V ;W ) = a. For V /∈ A,
such a doesn’t exist, and θ = 0 in this region; otherwise, for V ∈ A, the above expression
has a unique solution given by: θ(z, V ) = q−1
(
a
B(z,rd,V ;W )
)
:
θ(z, V ) =
 0, if V ∈ A,q−1( aB(z,rd,V ;W )), if V /∈ A.
Eventually, the existence and uniqueness of p and q follows immediately from the above
results and equations (1.8)-(1.10).
(b-0) The operator T is well defined and maps P into itself.
Let us consider B ∈ P, and define TB = T (B).
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1. TB is continuous and concave in V . This is true since TB is a linear combination of the
auxiliary functions pi and B, which are both continuous and concave in V .
2. From the property above, TB is differentiable (almost) everywhere and we can use the
envelope theorem to show that the first-order derivative verifying ∂TB(z,rd,V )V = − 1u′(d(z,rd,V )) .
We have already established that for a given pair (z, rd) ∈ Z×R, the dividend payout policy
is bounded. The derivative of TB is therefore also bounded on both sides and is strictly
negative. It is therefore also the case for TB given that V is bounded.
Eventually, TB is decreasing in V and the bi-Lipschitz continuity property follows directly,
given that TB is differentiable with first-order derivative bounded on both sides.
This concludes the proof of B ∈ P ⇒ TB ∈ P.
(b-1) The operator T is continuous over P.
Let us introduce the infinite norm ‖.‖ such that ‖B‖ = supz,rd,V ∈Z×Rd×VB(z, rd, V ). Let
us also fix z, rd, V and consider two functions B1, B2 ∈ P2 and their respective images
Bˆ1 = TBˆ1, and Bˆ2 = TBˆ2. In order to establish continuity over P, I need to show that
∀ l > 0, such that ‖B1 −B2‖ < l, ∃  > 0 s.t. ‖Bˆ1 − Bˆ2‖ < .
Let Φ1 = (d1,K1, {V ′1}) and Φ2 = (d2,K2, {V ′2}) be the optimal policies maximizing the
bank’s contracting problem associated with B1 and B2. Let us also consider the suboptimal
policy Φ˜2 = (d˜2, K˜2, {V ′1}), where the vector of continuation values {V ′1} is exactly the
same as for policy Φ1 and where d˜2 and K˜2 satisfy the corresponding promise-keeping and
participation constraints for B2.
‖TB1(z, rd, V )− TB2(z, rd, V )‖ = ‖B1(z, rd, V,Φ1)−B2(z, rd, V,Φ2)‖
≤ ‖B1(z, rd, V,Φ1)−B2(z, rd, V, Φ˜2)‖
≤ ‖pi1(Φ1)− pi2(Φ˜2) + β(1− σ)E[B1 −B2]‖
≤ ‖pi1(Φ1)− pi2(Φ˜2)‖+ β(1− σ)‖B1 −B2‖.
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We now need to show that there exists a finite upper bound αT , such that the first com-
ponent of the right-hand-side ‖pi1(Φ1)− pi2(Φ˜2)‖ is bounded above by αT ‖B1 −B2‖. First,
notice that:
‖pi1(Φ1)− pi2(Φ˜2)‖ ≤ ‖d1 − d˜2‖+ ‖zf(K1)− rdK1 − zf(K˜2) + rdK˜2‖. (A.4)
Technical assumption: f is bi-Lipshitz continuous in K, such that there exist upper and
lower bounds (αf , α¯f ):
αf |K2 −K1| < |f(K2)− f(K1)| < α¯f |K2 −K1| ∀(K1,K2).
Let us now show the following auxiliary lemma, which will be useful for establishing the
bounds of the right-hand-side of the expression above.
Auxiliary Lemma. For B1, B2 ∈ P2, we have:
1. ‖θ1 − θ2‖ < αθ‖B1 −B2‖
2. ‖p1 − p2‖ < αp‖B1 −B2‖
3. ‖W1 −W2‖ < αW ‖B1 −B2‖
Proof. Consider (z, rd) given.
1. Let us assume market V is open for both B1 and B2. We have:
0 = B1(V1)q(θ1)−B2(V2)q(θ2)
= [B1(V1)−B2(V2)]q(θ1) +B2(V2)[q(θ1)− q(θ2)]
≤ [B1(V1)−B2(V2)] + ‖B2‖[q(θ1)− q(θ2)].
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But q is a convex function, hence we can write:
q(θ1)− q(θ2) ≤ q′(max(θ1, θ2))(θ1 − θ2),
and
−‖B2‖[q(θ1)− q(θ2)] ≤ [B1(V1)−B2(V2)],
and
−‖B2‖q′(max(θ1, θ2))(θ1 − θ2) ≤ [B1(V1)−B2(V2)].
Using the definition of B¯, we have by construction c ≥ Γ0rd(rd)B¯(z, rd, V ) (where
Γ0rd(rd) is the unconditional probability assigned to state rd at entry). We can then
define c¯ = maxrd∈Rd{ cΓ0rd (rd)}, and eventually write the following inequality, using
‖B2‖ ≤ c¯, and define αθ = 1c¯q′(max(θ1,θ2)) :
|θ1 − θ2| ≤ 1
c¯q′(max(θ1, θ2))
‖B1 −B2‖.
2. Fix V . By definition, we have:
p1(z, rd, V )− p2(z, rd, V ) = p(θ1(z, rd, V ))− p(θ2(z, rd, V )).
We can therefore write the following inequality thanks to the concavity of p:
|p1(z, rd, V )− p2(z, rd, V )| ≤ p′(0)|θ1(z, rd, V ))− θ2(z, rd, V )|
≤ p′(0)αθ‖B1(V1)−B2(V2)‖.
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3. We have:
W1(z)−W2(z) = β [E[W1(z′)−W2(z′)] + p1(θ1)(V1 −W1)− p2(θ2)(V2 −W2)]
≤ β [E[W1(z′)−W2(z′)] + p1(θ1)(V1 −W1)− p2(θ1)(V1 −W2)]
≤ β [E[W1(z′)−W2(z′)] + V1(p1(θ1)− p2(θ1))− p1(θ1)W1 + p2(θ1)W2]
≤ β [(1− p1(θ1))‖W1 −W2‖+ (V1 −W2)|(p2(θ1)− p1(θ1))|] .
We can eventually proceed by re-arranging terms to obtain the following inequality:
‖W1 −W2‖ ≤ β
1− β (max(|V1|) + max(|W2|))|(p2(θ1)− p1(θ1))|
≤ β
1− β (max(V1) + max(W2))p
′(0)αθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
αW
‖B1 −B2‖.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
We can now go back to inequality (A.4) to establish our continuity result:
‖pi1(Φ1)− pi2(Φ˜2)‖ ≤ ‖d1 − d˜2‖+ ‖zf(K˜1)− rdK˜1 − zf(K˜2) + rdK˜2‖.
Let us look at each component in the right-hand-side separately. First, we want to bound
‖d1 − d˜2‖. To establish this result, let us first notice that:
min{u′}‖d1 − d˜2‖ ≤ ‖u(d1)− u(d˜2)‖,
and
‖u(d1)− u(d˜2)‖ = ‖V − βE[σW1(z′) + (1− σ)V ′1 ]− [V − βE[σW2(z′) + (1− σ)V ′1 ]]‖
≤ β‖W1 −W2‖
≤ βαW ‖B1 −B2‖.
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Second, we want to bound ‖zf(K1)− rdK1 − zf(K˜2) + rdK˜2‖.
Let us fix (z, rd, V ). We have:
u(ηK1)− u(ηK˜2) = βEz[H1(z′)−H2(z′)].
But, we also have:
H1(z)−H2(z) = ξEz[W1(z′)−W2(z′)] + (1− ξ)βEz[H1(z′)−H2(z′)],
and, from the definition of H given by equation (1.2)
|H1 −H2| ≤ ξ
1− β(1− ξ) |W1 −W2|
≤ ξ
1− β(1− ξ)αW ‖B1 −B2‖.
Eventually, we use the property of concavity of u to get:
|K1 − K˜2| ≤ 1
ηu′(ηmax(K))
[u(ηK1)− u(ηK˜2)],
and
|K1 − K˜2| ≤ βαk‖B1 −B2‖,
with αk =
ξ
1−β(1−ξ)
αW
ηu′(ηK¯) , and K¯ = max {KFB(z, rd)}(z,rd)∈Z×Rd .
The result above also goes through for any concave function of K (adjusting the multiplica-
tive term by 1
f ′(K¯)), and we can finally write:
‖TB1(z, rd, V )− TB2(z, rd, V )‖ ≤ β
(
1 + αW +
αk
zf ′(K¯)
)
‖B1 −B2‖.
This completes the proof of (b-1).
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(c) Equicontinuity of T (P).
Let us show that ∀  > 0, ∃ δ > 0, such that for all νi = (zi, rd,i, Vi), i = 1, 2
‖ξ1 − ξ2‖ < δ ⇒ TB(ν1)− TB(ν2) < , ∀ B ∈ P.
Fix  > 0, and pick δ < min
(
min
(z1,z2)∈Z
|z1 − z2|, min
(rd,1,rd2 )∈Rd
|rd,1 − rd,2|, 
αV
)
.
For ξ1, ξ2 such that ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖ < δ, we have z1 = z2, and rd,1 = rd,2.
We can therefore conclude that:
‖TB(ξ1)− TB(ξ2)‖ ≤ αv|V1 − V2| ≤ αv‖ξ1 − ξ2‖ < .
Now that we have shown that assumptions (i), (ii), and (iii) are verified, Schauder’s fixed
point theorem applies and there exists a fixed point B∗ ∈ P such that T (B∗) = B∗. Even-
tually, all the remaining equilibrium objects (W ∗, ρ∗, θ∗) and policy functions associated
with the optimal contract are also well defined.
This concludes the proof.
Proof. Proposition 8. Social Planner’s problem.
Let us start by simplifying some of the notations of the model before formalizing the social
planner’s problem. To keep notations simple, let us also abstract from the variables’ depen-
dence on aggregate shocks and bank-firm characteristics (rd,t−1, Vt−1) carried from period
t − 1. Let us also denote θV = θ(V ), the market tightness associated with firm value V,
V 0r the optimal firm value offered by banks with funding cost r, and the dividend policy
d(Vr) = d(r, Vr) and the joint surplus S(r, Vr) associated with funding cost r and firm value
Vr.
The social planner maximizes the discounted sum of utilities derived by banks and firms
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for incumbent lending relationships, utility derived by rationed entrepreneurs, minus total
origination costs. The problem is subject to the dynamics of the existing lending contracts
represented by the function fc (which depends only on (Vt−1, rt−1, rt)), the laws of motion
for credit rationing υt, and the distribution of lending relationships gt.
In order to keep this proof reasonably tractable, notice that the social planner faces the
same contracting frictions as each individual bank; hence, we can immediately replace the
original problem with the corresponding solution to its Lagrange multiplier formulation and
by taking the optimal weight on firm value to be Λt+1 =
1
u′(dt) .
The social planner therefore maximizes the following objective function:
max
υt,gt,θV ,Jt,Vt
E
∑
t
βt
[ ∑
rd,t,Vt
gt(rd,t, Vt) [S(rd,t, Vt)− d(Vt) + Λt+1(rd,t, Vt)u(d(Vt))]
−cJt + υtu(d0)
]
s.t. ∀ (t, zt)
Λt+1(rd,t, Vt) =
1
u′(d(Vt))
, ∀ (rd,t, Vt)
Vt = fc(Vt−1, rt−1, rt), ∀ (Vt−1, rt−1, rt)
υt = υt−1
(
1− (1− σ)
∑
r
Γ0rd(r)p(θVr )
)
+ (1− υt−1)σ
gt(r, V ) =
∑
Vt−1|Vt=V
(1− σ)gt−1(rt−1, Vt−1)Γrd(rt−1, r) + Jtq(θVr )Γ0rd(r)1Vr=V ,∀ (r, V ),
where Γrd is the transition probability and Γ
0
rd
is the unconditional entry distribution of
the idiosyncratic funding cost.
The planner’s problem is also constrained by the credit market clearing conditions, which
imply that the total number of funded entrepreneurs equals the total number of loans
originated within each active submarket. In the context of the model, this is simply given
by the following standard condition:
υt−1p(θVrt ) = q(θVrt )Jt, ∀ θ > 0.
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Note also that the mass of firms in the economy satisfies the following identity:
υt−1 +
∑
r,V
gt−1(r, V ) = 1.
To further characterize this problem, let us now denote µ the multiplier associated with the
law of motion of υ, and {ζθV }V the set of multipliers associated with the market clearing
condition for each active submarket. We can write the following generalized expression:
max
υt,gt,θV ,Jt,Vt
E
∑
t
βt
( ∑
rd,t,rd,t+1,Vt−1
(1− σ)gt−1(rd,t−1, Vt−1)Γrd(rd,t−1, rd,t)[S(rd,t, Vt)
− d(Vt) + 1
u′(d(Vt))
u(d(Vt))]
+ Jt
(∑
r
Γ0rd(r)q(θVrt )
[
[S(rt, Vrt)− d(Vrt) +
1
u′(d(Vrt))
u(d(Vrt))]
]
− c
)
−
∑
V,θV >0
ζθV,t
∑
r,Vr=V
Γ0rd(r)[Jtq(θV )− p(θV )υt−1]
+ υtu(d0)− µt
(
υt − υt−1
(
1− (1− σ)
∑
r
Γ0rd(r)p(θVr )
)− σ∑
r,V
gt−1(r, V )
))
.
Replacing ϕV = q(θV ) in the objective function allows us to have a well-defined and strictly
concave problem in all its maximands over a convex set. This in turn is sufficient to establish
the existence and uniqueness of an optimal solution to the social planner’s problem.
We can eventually decompose the above expression into three auxiliary and independent
problems for (i) incumbent banks, (ii) entrant banks, and (iii) unfunded firms, which are
all independent from gt−1, the distribution of lending relationships at t− 1:
(i) Incumbent banks:
E
[∑
t
βtΓrd(rd,t−1, rd,t)
[
(1− σ)[S(rd,t, Vt)− d(Vt) + 1
u′(d(Vt))
u(d(Vt))] + σµt
]]
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(ii) Entrant banks:
max
θV ,{Vr}r,Jt
JtE
∑
r
Γ0rd(r)q(θVr )
∑
t′≥t
βt
′−t
[
(1− σ)[S(rt′ , Vrt′ )− d(Vrt′ ) + 1u′(d(Vrt′ ))u(d(Vrt′ ))]+ σµt′
]
−Jt[c+
∑
r
ζθVrΓ
0
rd(r)q(θVr )]
(iii) Unfunded firms:
max
υt
∑
t
βt
[
υtu(d0)− µt
(
υt − υt−1
(
1−
∑
r
Γ0rd(r)p(θVr )
))
+ υt−1
∑
r
Γ0rd(r)ζθVr,tp(θVr )
]
.
Let us now compare the above problems with those obtained in the competitive equilibrium.
First, let us identify µt = Wt. As a result, the problem for incumbent banks is exactly the
same as the saddle-point problem obtained in the competitive case.
Turning to the problem of entrant banks, we can rewrite the maximization problem at date
t, associated with each entrant bank of type r as:
max
Vr
∑
t′≥t
βt
′−t
[
(1− σ)
[
S(rt′ , Vrt′ )− d(Vrt′ ) +
1
u′(d(Vr))
u(d(Vrt′ ))
]
+ σµ′t
]
− ζθVr,t .
Thus, the above problem is similar to the entrants’ problem in the competitive equilibrium
if:
ζθVr,t =
∑
t′≥t
βt
′−t
[
(1− σ) u(d(Vrt′ ))
u′(d(Vrt′ ))
+ σµt′
]
.
Finally, turning to the unfunded firm problem, the first order condition on υt yields:
0 = u(d0)− µt + βµt+1
[
1−
∑
r
Γ0rd(r)p(θVr)
]
+ β
∑
r
ζθVr,tΓ
0
rd
(r)p(θVr,t+1).
Using µt = Wt, we can re-arrange terms of the above condition to obtain the following
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identity, satisfied within each active submarket:
Wt = u(d0) + β
[
(1− p(θVr))Wt+1 + p(θVr)ζθVr,t
]
= u(d0) + β
(1− p(θVr))Wt+1 + p(θVr)∑
t′≥t
βt
′−t
[
(1− σ) u(d(Vrt′ ))
u′(d(Vrt′ ))
+ σWt′
] .
The above expression resembles the one obtained in the competitive search equilibrium
(equations (1.8) - (1.9)), with one major difference. Indeed, the equivalence between the
two expressions is only true if
∑
t′≥t β
t′−t[(1 − σ) u(d(Vrt′ ))u′(d(Vrt′ )) + σWt′ ] = V . However, this is
the case only when entrepreneurs are risk neutral and u′ = 1. More generally, the above
result establishes that the obtained competitive search equilibrium is always constrained
inefficient whenever entrepreneurs are risk averse.
This concludes the proof.
Stokey and Lucas (1989)
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